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1 Introduction
Since the legalization of abortion in the United States in 1973 (Roe v. Wade), state and federal legislatures
have enacted hundreds of laws imposing a wide range of requirements on abortion patients and providers.
Prior studies show that demand-side restrictions significantly affect abortion rates, while laws targeted at
abortion providers decrease the availability of abortion clinics.1 However, the effects of these restrictions may
extend beyond abortion choices themselves. In the first place, women may also adjust their contraceptive use
in response to these policies. Furthermore, if restrictions on abortions lead to changes in fertility, women’s
schooling and labor market choices may also be affected, as these decisions are known to be closely related
to fertility.2 In this paper, I evaluate the long-run effects of regulations that limit the availability of abortion
services, as well as policies that directly affect the price of contraception, on abortion and contraceptive
choices of young women and on their life-cycle fertility, schooling and labor supply.
I proceed in three steps. First, I specify a dynamic life-cycle model of abortion, contraceptive use,
schooling and labor supply decisions of women in the U.S. I then structurally estimate the parameters of
the model by simulated maximum likelihood using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY97), combined with abortion provider data from the Guttmacher Institute (GI) and information on
mandatory counseling laws enacted by several states during the sample period. Variation across time and
space in these regulations and in the availability of abortion providers at the county level provides a valuable
source of identification for the model parameters. In the estimation, I allow for underreporting of abortions by
NLSY respondents and use aggregate abortion rates to identify the degree of bias in these abortion reports.
Finally, I use the estimated model to simulate the effects of several counterfactual policies. I find that
restrictions on abortions lead to a large increase in contraceptive use, which moderates the effect of abortion
restrictions on birth rates and fertility. The counterfactual analysis shows that eliminating access to abortion
services decreases accumulated schooling by 13% and lifetime earnings by 5% among women who would have
ever had an abortion. The average effect on lifetime welfare is small, but there is substantial heterogeneity,
and women at the right tail of the distribution suffer large losses in individual lifetime welfare. As an
alternative to restrictive policies, providing free contraception increases contraceptive use by 12 percentage
points, leading to a 38% decrease in the abortion rate for young women.3
In the model, raising children while working or attending school is costly. These costs, together with
preferences for the number and timing of children, as well as preferences for the marital arrangement in
which they are born and raised, generate incentives to control fertility. To do this, women in the model first
decide on their contraceptive use. By using contraception, they lower, but do not eliminate, the chance of
becoming pregnant. If a pregnancy occurs, they choose whether to obtain an abortion. Abortions entail
both psychic and monetary costs. The psychic costs differ according to religiosity and may increase if the
state in which they live imposes mandatory counseling restrictions. Women who choose an abortion and
live in a county without an abortion provider need to travel to the nearest provider, which increases their
monetary cost. In the labor market, women receive wage offers that depend on the current level of human
capital. After knowing if they became pregnant, they decide whether to work part-time, full-time, or not
1Henshaw et al. (2009), Joyce et al. (2009), and Dennis et al. (2009) summarize the findings of the literature for Medicaid
funding restrictions, mandatory counseling requirements and parental consent requirements, respectively. Beauchamp (2012)
has shown that, between 1991 and 2005, supply-side regulation led to an annual average decrease of 5.86% in the number of
counties with a provider.
2See, for example, Rosenszweig and Wolpin (1980), Moffit (1984), Hotz and Miller (1988), Angrist and Evans (1998),
Francesconi (2002), Gayle and Miller (2006), Keane and Sauer (2009), Keane and Wolpin (2010), and Adda et al. (2012).
3For the purpose of analyzing abortion, contraceptive use, pregnancy and birth rates, I define young women as women ages
18 to 30.
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work at all. At this time, they also choose whether to attend school. Both of these choices affect future
wage offers, as human capital is accumulated through schooling and labor market experience. I make the
simplifying assumption that marital status and sexual activity evolve according to an exogenous stochastic
process. Finally, I allow for unobserved heterogeneity in preferences for abortions, schooling and leisure, in
initial human capital, and in marital status and sexual activity profiles.
I use data from the NLSY97 and the Guttmacher Institute census of abortion providers. The NLSY97
follows a sample of women born between 1980 and 1984, interviewing them yearly starting in 1997. The
sample period extends up to 2011 and includes women up to age 31. The data include detailed information
on demographics, sexuality, contraceptive use, fertility, schooling, labor market participation and wages of
the respondents. From the Guttmacher Institute census of abortion providers, I obtain information on the
number of specialized and non-specialized abortion clinics in each county. These clinics account for 94%
of all abortion procedures in the U.S. (Jones and Kooistra, 2011). I complement these data with publicly
available information on the enactment of mandatory counseling/waiting period laws. The number of states
with these kinds of restrictions increased from 12 to 25 during the sample period of the NLSY97. Thus,
variation across time and space in these restrictions, as well as in the availability of clinics offering abortion
services, provide useful information for the identification of the model parameters.
As documented for similar survey data (Jones and Kost, 2007), abortions are severely underreported in
the NLSY97. In the estimation of the model, I address this key issue by specifying a biased measurement error
process for abortions, pregnancies, miscarriages and births.4 I extend the simulated maximum likelihood
estimation approach introduced by Keane and Wolpin (2001) and formalized by Keane and Sauer (2009) to
incorporate information from aggregate abortion rates as a source of identification for the biased measurement
error process. These aggregate abortion rates, which I obtain from the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) and the Guttmacher Institute, do not suffer from underreporting, as they are calculated
using abortion counts directly reported by abortion providers.
I use the estimated model to simulate the long-run effects of three types of policies on young women’s
abortion, contraceptive use, schooling and labor supply decisions and on their lifetime fertility, human capital
accumulation and earnings. First, I consider the extreme case of a perfectly enforced ban on abortions, which
provides an upper bound on the potential effects of abortion restrictions. This makes it possible to quantify
the importance of the availability of abortion for contraceptive choices and for human capital accumulation
through schooling and labor supply. Model simulations show that, as a consequence of this ban, the rate
of contraceptive use for women ages 18 to 30 increases from 45.5% to 56%. As a result, the number of
pregnancies per 1000 women decreases from 137 to 118. The birth rate for this age group, on the other
hand, increases from 88 to 107 births per 1000 women each year.5 Given that the abortion rate in the
absence of this policy is 39 abortions per 1000 women, roughly one out of every two abortions is replaced by
an additional birth. The restriction disproportionately affects single women, making the fraction of children
born to single mothers increase from 25% to 30%. With respect to human capital, the average amount of
schooling accumulated after high school, 3.06 years in the absence of this policy, decreases by 0.15 years
(4.9%) and the fraction of women with a college degree drops by 2.3 percentage points. Moreover, among
the women who would have ever had an abortion in the absence of the ban –42% of the population–, the
decrease in average schooling is 0.36 years (13.2%), while the share of college graduates is 5.3 percentage
points lower. On average, lifetime earnings decrease by 4.6% for this group of women. There is substantial
4Because abortions, pregnancies, miscarriages and births are not independent events, the underreporting of abortions biases
the reports on these other variables as well.
5The remaining pregnancies result in a miscarriage.
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heterogeneity when calculating the individual lifetime welfare loss of eliminating abortion; 5% of women
experience a loss equivalent to at least 6% of their lifetime welfare, while more than half experience no loss
at all. Among women who would have ever had an abortion, 5% experience a loss larger than 10% of their
individual lifetime welfare.
Second, I analyze the effects of two less extreme restrictions on abortions: the expansion of mandatory
counseling laws and the closing of providers, a common consequence of laws targeted at abortion providers.
With respect to mandatory counseling laws, expanding them to all of the states where they are not currently
in place decreases the abortion rate for women ages 18 to 30 by 3.7 abortions per 1000 women, an 8.3%
reduction. The pregnancy rate falls by 2.4 pregnancies per 1000 women as a consequence of a 1.4 percentage
point increase in the use of contraception. Therefore, the birth rate increases by 1.2 births per 1000 women,
which corresponds to 32% of the change in the number of abortions. Turning to the closing of providers,
a large number of abortion clinics have recently closed, following the enactment of laws that impose strict
requirements on doctors and facilities. A well-known example is a 2013 Texas law known as HB2. In October
2014, after all of the provisions of this law had gone into effect, only 7 of the 46 clinics present in Texas
at the beginning of 2013 were still operating.6 I therefore examine the impact of these kinds of policies by
assessing the effect that closing all of the providers in a county has on women living in that county. I find
that, for the average woman living in a county that currently has an abortion provider, the abortion rate
would decrease by 6.8% if all the providers in her county closed. This means that more than 93% of women
who would have an abortion in the absence of this policy will now travel to a different county to obtain
the abortion. Among those for whom the abortion choice changes as a result of the closing of providers, an
increase in contraceptive use prevents the pregnancy in most cases and only 34% of them would have an
additional birth. Therefore, in both of these cases – the expansion of mandatory counseling laws and the
closing of providers–, the main effect of these restrictions on women who choose an abortion is to elevate
the costs they face. Conditional on pregnancy, very few women who have abortions would choose to carry
the pregnancy to term. Because the main mechanism through which abortion restrictions affect schooling
and labor supply is through their effect on births, there would be no significant effects on human capital
accumulation or labor market outcomes.
Finally, I evaluate the effects of a policy that fully subsidizes contraception as a potential alternative to
reduce the abortion rate. Model simulations show that, when contraception is free, the rate of contraceptive
use among young women is 13 percentage points higher, leading to a decrease in the pregnancy rate of 21.4
pregnancies per 1000 women (a 15.7% decrease) and a decrease in the abortion rate of 14.7 abortions per
1000 women (a 38% decrease). For a group of women who can be characterized as non-college educated
workers (based on the parameter estimates), this policy induces a substitution of labor supply from older
ages to relatively younger ages, together with a 16% decrease in lifetime fertility.
This paper adds to a small set of studies that have specified models of abortion choice (Akerlof et al., 1996;
Kane and Staiger, 1996; Kocharkov, 2012; Kennes and Knowles, 2013). In an influential theoretical paper,
Akerlof, Yellen, and Katz (1996) (AYK) proposed a mechanism through which the introduction (legalization)
of abortion could have changed norms surrounding marriage to explain the increase in out-of-wedlock births
that has been observed in recent decades. Kennes and Knowles (2013) (KK) build on the interest of AYK
and propose that the appearance of contraception and abortion could have decreased the value of marriage
6A week after the requirement that abortion providers meet the standards of ambulatory surgery centers went into effect
in October 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court temporarily enjoined this provision while a federal Circuit Court evaluates the
constitutionality of the law.
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by reducing the costs of sex outside of marriage. They calibrate their model to 1970 (before full legalization
of abortion and open access to the contraceptive pill) and find that 60% of the changes in marital patterns
and out of wedlock birth rates observed since 1970 can be explained by introducing abortion and access to
the contraceptive pill in this context. Besides the focus on abortion itself, these two papers and my own share
an interest in how changes in abortion and contraception regulation may have effects on other dimensions of
women’s lives. However, while AYK and KK focus on the marriage market, my paper focuses on the labor
market, which is not included in their analysis. Moreover, this is the first paper that estimates a model of
abortion choice.
I also contribute to a literature that has estimated models of contraceptive choice. Hotz and Miller (1988)
estimated an econometric model of fertility and labor supply of married women in which fertility is imperfectly
controlled through the use of contraception. Although they do not estimate a full behavioral model of these
choices, their model can be interpreted as an approximation of a life-cycle model of labor force participation
and contraceptive choice. It remains the only paper to estimate a model of contraceptive choice where the
incentives to use contraception are tied to the labor market.7 Carro and Mira (2006) estimate a dynamic
discrete choice model of contraceptive decisions of Spanish families over the life cycle. Their model shares
several features with the contraceptive use aspect of my model. However, given their interest in explaining
the life-cycle patterns of contraceptive choices, they ignore abortion decisions as well as any connection with
the labor market. Delavande (2008) estimates a static model of contraceptive choice in which beliefs over the
effectiveness of different methods are allowed to differ from actual effectiveness, showing the importance of
these beliefs for women when choosing their contraceptive method. Unlike Delavande, I do not have data on
expectations or beliefs, which prevents me from allowing for such differences in my model. Arcidiacono et al.
(2012) estimate a dynamic discrete choice model of contraception and sexual activity among teenagers and
show the importance of habit persistence for these decisions and the effect of policies related to contraception
among teenagers. I have not included the sexual dimension as an endogenous variable in my model. As
opposed to Arcidiacono et al. (2012), where sexual initiation is a crucial aspect of treating sexual activity
as a choice, more than 75% of women in my sample are sexually active at the beginning of the modeling
period. Moreover, it is not clear that a proper model of sexual activity choice (i.e., one with predictive
power) could be developed in the context of this paper with the available data. Aside from Levine (2003),
who finds that the reduction in pregnancies among minors as a consequence of parental consent laws comes
from increased contraceptive use rather than changes in sexual activity, there is no empirical evidence to
verify the restrictiveness of the exogeneity assumption. While previous studies have ignored the abortion
decision when analyzing contraceptive choices, in this paper I consider the contraceptive choice together with
the abortion decision. This allows me to quantify the extent to which contraceptive choices are affected when
abortion costs change and vice-versa. Furthermore, when analyzing contraceptive and abortion choices, I
consider their relationship with labor supply and schooling choices, explicitly taking into account crucial
incentives for the use of abortion and contraception. Thus, I am able to quantify the effects of restrictions
on abortions on human capital accumulation through schooling and labor market experience.
Finally, this paper contributes to a large literature in demography and economics which has estimated
the effects of changes in abortion regulation and policies related to access to contraception on abortion rates,
birth rates and, in very few cases, on contraceptive use. Some of these studies relate to policies that I
evaluate in this paper. For instance, Joyce et al. (1997) and Joyce and Kaestner (2000) study the short-
7It is worth noting that Hotz and Miller (1993) also estimated a contraceptive choice model in their seminal paper, although
it is only used as an example for the implementation of the method they proposed for the estimation of dynamic discrete choice
models.
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run effects of the introduction of a mandatory counseling and waiting period law in Mississippi. The key
findings from this set of papers are that the law decreased the abortion rate by 10% while increasing the
proportion of second trimester abortions and the mean gestational age at the time of abortion. Although the
populations to which these results and mine apply are different, the magnitude of these effects is consistent
with my findings. I contribute to the analysis of mandatory counseling and waiting period laws by analyzing
their effect in states where they have not been implemented and by assessing their impact on contraceptive
choices, birth rates, fertility and human capital accumulation. Kearney and Levine (2009) study the effects
of Medicaid waivers which expanded Medicaid coverage of family planning services in many states. Their
research relates to the contraception subsidy that I evaluate. They find that waivers that raised the income
threshold to receive family planning services had a strong impact on contraceptive use and birth rates, which
are consistent with my results. However, given the data they use, they are unable to conclude whether these
policies had any effects on abortion decisions. Joyce et al. (2012) analyze the effect of distance to New York
on abortion decisions during the years immediately before Roe v. Wade, when abortion was legal in New
York State but not in most of the U.S. Their results highlight the importance of local availability of providers
for abortion decisions. As mentioned, these studies relate to policies that I analyze in this paper. Thus,
in Section 6, I discuss in more detail how their results relate to mine. The literature has also studied two
kinds of demand-side restrictions that are not directly related to the policies I evaluate: parental consent
restrictions for minors and funding restrictions for Medicaid members. Their findings are worth noting here,
as they present strong evidence of the impact that restrictions in general have on abortion decisions. Joyce
et al. (2006) and Colman and Joyce (2009) use administrative data from Texas to analyze the effect of
the introduction of a parental consent requirement for minors in that state on abortion rates and on the
fraction of second trimester abortions. When comparing abortion rates for women at both sides of the
age threshold that defines whether parental consent is required (18 years), they find that the abortion rate
decreased by 16% and the rate of second trimester abortions increased by 21% for those for whom parental
consent is required, relative to those for which it is not. In North Carolina, the budget allocated to pay
for abortions for Medicaid members has been exhausted before the end of the year on several occasions.
The lack of funding for Medicaid abortions induced by this event has been used as a natural experiment to
estimate the short-run effects of changes in funding on abortion decisions. For instance, Cook et al. (1999)
find that, among eligible women, 37% of the pregnancies that would have ended in abortion were carried
to term, a result that is consistent with the later analysis of Morgan and Parnell (2002). Finally, with
respect to the supply-side restrictions, Beauchamp (2012) estimates a dynamic model of entry and exit of
providers to the abortion market. He finds that restrictions imposed on providers lead to the concentration
of abortion services in fewer and bigger abortion clinics, decreasing the number of providers and thus access
to abortion services. As all of these studies show, there is strong evidence that the regulations that have
been imposed since Roe v. Wade have relevant effects on abortion decisions directly, as well as indirectly
through their effect on the availability of providers. This supports the importance of analyzing the effect
of further restrictions. The evaluation of the perfectly enforced ban on abortions – the strictest restriction
possible– is particularly important as the number and variety of restrictions accumulates and legislatures
discuss increasingly restrictive regulations. I contribute to this broad literature by developing a framework
to analyze these counterfactual policies, quantifying the effect of abortion policies on contraceptive use, and
assessing their potential effects on schooling and labor supply decisions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. I provide a description of the context of abortion and
contraceptive use in the United States in Section 2. I then present the model in Section 3. Next, in Section
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4, I describe the data. Section 5 describes the estimation method and the way in which I address the
underreporting of abortions in the data. Results can be found in section 6. In section 7, I conclude.
2 Background
2.1 Legal context
In this section I provide a brief summary of the recent history of abortion regulation in the U.S. to describe
the context in which the choices studied in this paper are made, focusing on certain restrictions that are
crucial to this analysis. The behavioral model in section 3 represents decisions made in this particular
environment.
Up until 1967, abortion was illegal in most cases for all of the states of the U.S. It was generally allowed
if carrying the pregnancy to term would put the mother’s life at risk. Some states allowed it in cases of
rape as well. Between 1967 and 1973, some states started allowing abortions under a slightly larger array of
circumstances, following the guidelines established in a 1962 proposal by the American Law Institute. Mean-
while, four states – New York, Alaska, Washington, and Hawaii – repealed the laws prohibiting abortions,
making it legal to obtain abortions in these states. In 1973, the Supreme Court ruled that abortion was
protected by the legal right to privacy under the U.S. Constitution (Roe v. Wade). As a consequence of this,
nobody in the U.S. can be prosecuted for seeking or providing an abortion, subject to some restrictions on
the maximum gestational age at which abortions can be performed. Roe v. Wade acknowledges a legitimate
interest of the State on the life of the fetus as gestation increases. Therefore, individual states are allowed to
have specific regulations as long as these do not impose an “excessive burden” on women seeking an abortion.
However, what has been considered to be “excessive burden” has varied over time.
In 1976, the Hyde Amendment was approved by U.S. Congress. This law excludes abortion services from
the set of services that can be covered by Federal health provision. In practice, this means that Federal
funds cannot be used to perform abortions for Medicaid members. Individual states can, nevertheless, use
their own funds. Today, 17 states use their own funds to finance abortions for Medicaid women (Jones et al.,
2010).
In 1992, the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of five regulations imposed by the 1982 Penn-
sylvania Abortion Control Act (Casey v. Planned Parenthood). Although the requirement of spousal noti-
fication for married women was struck down, the Court upheld the other four regulations: the requirement
that doctors inform women about the health consequences of obtaining an abortion, the mandate of a 24
hour waiting period after this information was provided, the requirement that minors obtain consent from
a parent or legal guardian, and a series of reporting mandates imposed on abortion providers. As a con-
sequence of this ruling, many states imposed similar restrictions in the years to follow. Moreover, because
Casey v. Planned Parenthood did not consider these restrictions to impose “excessive burden”, this ruling
opened the door for new restrictions to be imposed by state laws.
Demand-side restrictions that have been imposed generally fall into one of the following categories:
mandatory counseling and waiting periods, parental consent/notification for minors, Medicaid bans, ultra-
sound requirements, or health insurance bans. As of 2014, 26 states require counseling and waiting periods;
39 require either notification or consent of parents or legal guardians for minors seeking to obtain an abortion;
8 states do not allow private health insurance plans to cover the costs of abortions except when the woman’s
life is in danger and 25 (including the previous 8) restrict coverage for health insurance plans offered through
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the exchanges created by the Affordable Care Act; 3 states require that an ultrasound be performed and
showed to each abortion patient; and 9 require the ultrasound be performed and the woman be given the
option of watching it.
Despite this large variation in policies, only mandatory counseling/waiting period restrictions and Med-
icaid bans provide variation that could potentially be used to estimate the model in this paper. Because I
focus on young adults, minor consent requirements are not binding. Health insurance bans are not frequent
enough, as they were present only in 5 states by 2011, the last year for which I have data. Most ultrasound
requirements have been imposed over the last couple of years as well.
The timing of mandatory counseling and waiting periods restrictions offers very useful variation for
estimation. In 1997, when NLSY97 data collection began, only 12 states had imposed this kind of restrictions;
by 2011, the last year in the sample period, this number had increased to 25. Thus, variation across space and
time can be used in the estimation. On the other hand, there has been no policy variation in Medicaid funding
of abortions since 1997. Thus, only variation between states could be exploited. From the 26 states that
currently have mandatory counseling restrictions, 23 also have Medicaid bans. Thus, it is difficult to identify
any effect of Medicaid bans separately. Moreover, including Medicaid in the model would require explicitly
modeling the different rules for eligibility across states and time, making assumptions on how women form
expectations about the changes in Medicaid eligibility rules, and including the Medicaid enrollment decision
in the model. Given the little variation that can be exploited, modeling Medicaid would over-complicate the
model without adding much to the estimation. Thus, I restrict my attention to women who are high school
graduates in an attempt to reduce the number of women in my sample whose decisions could be influenced
by this policy variation.
The counseling and waiting period restrictions vary from one state to another but follow the same general
form. A pre-determined set of information needs to be provided to any woman seeking an abortion in a
mandatory counseling session. Then, a pre-specified amount of time needs to go by between this session
and when the abortion procedure is performed. Some states require that women obtaining abortions receive
some basic information on the risks prior to the procedure, while others require a much more detailed set
of information. In several cases, this information is either medically inaccurate or is not related at all to
risks or consequences of the procedure and thus is medically unnecessary. In some cases, the information
can be provided by staff members over the phone, while in the most restrictive cases the information must
be provided in person and at least 24 hours prior to the procedure. In those cases, women seeking abortions
need to make two different visits to the medical facility.
Besides these demand-side restrictions, many laws impose requirements on the doctors performing the
abortions, the type of procedures that can be used and physical requirements for facilities of abortion
providers. Some other laws limit the type of methods that can be used. Many of these laws, especially
the ones imposing requirements on doctors and providers, are particularly restrictive as these provisions are
difficult to fulfill for many abortion clinics, thus forcing many of them to close.8 Therefore, the effects of
these laws on abortion decisions can be captured by their indirect effect through the changes they induce on
provider availability and access to services.
8These laws, especially in their most recent and restrictive versions, are referred to as Targeted Restrictions on Abortion
Providers or TRAP laws.
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2.2 Access to abortion services
In 2011, 89% of the counties in the U.S. did not have an abortion provider, although only 38% of women
ages 15 to 44 lived in these counties. These figures, however, display substantial regional variation. While
94% of counties in the Midwest didn’t have an abortion provider in 2011, only 65% didn’t have one in the
Northeast. There were 225 providers in New York State in 2011. This number was four times as large as
the one for Texas in that year (Jones and Jerman, 2014).9
Abortions typically take place in clinics specializing in abortions (70%) and other non-specialized clinics
(24%).10. 94% of the abortions in 2008 (92% in 2011) were performed by providers that handle 400 cases
or more each year (Jones and Kooistra, 2011; Jones and Jerman, 2014) I will include information on the
location of these providers in the estimation, as will be described in Section 4. Any effect of supply side
restrictions will be captured in the estimation through its effect on the availability of providers at the county
level.
2.3 Abortion patients
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the abortion rate in the U.S. from 1973 to 2011. Following Roe v. Wade,
the abortion rate in the U.S rose steadily and peaked around 1981 when it reached almost 30 abortions per
1000 women. The rate has declined ever since, reaching a low of 16.9 abortions per 1000 women in 2011.
The pregnancy rate (not shown) has followed a similar trend but with a slightly less steep decline. As of
2011 , 21.2% of pregnancies ended in abortions.11 12
Table 1 divides U.S. women age 15-44 according to different socio-demographic characteristics and
presents the share of the total number of abortions coming from each group (column 1) and the num-
ber of abortions per 1000 women in that group (column 2). In this way, column 1 provides information
on the groups that account for the largest part of the total number of abortions. From an aggregate point
of view, these are the women that drive the trends in abortion rates. The abortion rates in column 2, on
the other hand, show the probability of getting an abortion conditional on being in that group. They thus
provide information on the characteristics more closely correlated with abortion decisions.
In terms of the share, women ages 18-34 account for over 82% of the abortions in the U.S. with almost
70% coming from women 18-30, which is the age group in the data I use to estimate the model. Also, 87%
of the procedures involved women with at least a high school degree or GED. As mentioned earlier, these
are the women I use for the estimation in this paper and thus they are the ones for which any results apply.
Finally, in terms of marital status, only 15% of abortion patients are married women. On the other hand,
30% come from women in cohabiting relationships, despite the fact that less than 10% of the women ages
15-44 belong to this group.
Cohabitation is also very strongly correlated with the decision to get an abortion: the abortion rate for
women in this type of relationship is 52 abortions per 1000 women. Married women, on the other hand, have
an extremely low abortion rate of only 6.6 abortions per 1000 women. The abortion rates are practically
the same for all education groups – around 22 abortions per 1000 women – except for college graduates,
who have a lower abortion rate. Not surprisingly, the abortion rates are higher for age groups that are more
fecund. The rates are above the average for women 18-29, with the highest abortion rate being that of
9The number of providers has decreased dramatically in Texas since 2011, the last year in the sample period I use in the
estimation.
10These shares are for 2008.
112011 is the last year for which an official pregnancy rate is available.
12This fraction counts only abortions and pregnancies ending in live births.
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Figure 1: Abortion rate U.S. 1973-2011.
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Abortion rate is the number of abortions per 1000 women age 15-44.
Source: Guttmacher Institute.
women 20-24 years old. There are also important differences in terms of race: abortion rates are the highest
for (non-hispanic) black women (40.2), followed by hispanic women (28.7). The rate for white non-hispanic
women is the lowest.
There is substantial variation in terms of the fraction of abortions in a particular state that come from
women who are residents of another state. This fraction goes from 0 in Wyoming (where there are less
than 1000 abortions per year and none of the 3 providers are specialized clinics) to 54% in Washington D.C.
(Pazol et al., 2011). This suggests that a large number of women travel to get abortions in a different place
than where they live, plausibly due, at least in part, to the absence of abortion providers where they reside.
This is consistent with the importance of the distance and local availability of abortion providers that Joyce
et al. (2012) found for women’s abortion decisions around the time of the legalization of abortion.
Finally, in terms of the payments for abortion procedures, nearly 60% of the women who get abortions
pay for the full cost of the procedure out-of-pocket. Only 20% of the procedures are paid for by Medicaid
(Jones et al., 2010). Finally, it is worth noting that 54% of the women who got abortions in 2008 reported
that they had been using a contraceptive method at the time of the pregnancy. 38% said they were not
using one at the time but had used a contraceptive method in the past. Only 8% reported they had never
used any contraceptive method (Jones et al., 2010).
2.4 Contraceptive use
Table 2 shows usage rates for different contraceptive methods by age, as reported in the National Survey
of Family Growth 2006 − 2008. (Mosher and Jones, 2010). Even though these numbers come from cross
sectional data, they suggest a life cycle pattern of substitution of transitory methods for permanent ones.
They also show how the contraceptive pill and condom are the most preferred methods. These patterns
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motivate the definition of contraceptive method options in the model, as it is described in the next section.
Table 1: Abortions by socio-demographic characteristics. 2008.
Age % Rate
15-17 6.2 11.3
18-19 11 34.7
20-24 33.4 39.9
25-29 24.4 28.6
30-34 13.5 17.1
35-39 8.2 9.3
>39 2.9 3.2
Education
<High School 12.3 23.4
High School/GED 28.3 21.2
Some college/ Associate degree 39.5 23.6
College or more 19.9 12.4
Union Status
Married 14.8 6.6
Cohabiting 29.2 52
Never married, not cohabiting 45 23.9
Previously married, not cohabiting 11 25.6
Race
Non hispanic white 36.1 11.5
Non hispanic black 29.6 40.2
Non hispanic other 9.4 25.9
Hispanic 24.9 28.7
The first column shows the fraction of abortions corresponding to each group. Abortion rate: number of abortions per 1000
women in each group.
Source: Jones et al. (2010) and Jones and Kavanaugh (2011) based on GI 2008 census of abortion providers.
3 Model
To answer the questions that guide this research, I develop a discrete choice dynamic programming model of
abortion, contraceptive, labor supply, and schooling decisions over the life cycle. In this section, I present the
basic structure of the model. Because one of the main goals of this paper is to perform counterfactual policy
experiments, the model includes many components intended to capture the facts and correlations described
in section 2. With few exceptions, I do not explicitly present here the functional form or distributional
assumptions for the different elements in the model. I refer the reader to the Appendix A for details.
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Table 2: contraceptive use and method by age (%). 2006-208
Using Method used (if using)
Age contraception Pill Condom Sterilization All other
15-19 28.2 54.1 22.8 0.0 23.1
20-24 54.7 48.0 24.5 3.1 24.4
25-29 64.2 35.1 20.5 18.3 26.1
30-34 70.3 24.8 17.1 37.6 20.5
35-39 75.0 19.3 11.2 54.1 15.4
40-44 77.8 11.1 8.8 69.8 10.3
Source: Mosher and Jones (2010) based on NSFG data (2006-2008)
Sterilization includes male and female sterilization.
3.1 Environment and choice set
The agents in the model are women who are high school graduates.13 A period is a year and time is indexed
in terms of the individual’s age. In each period, starting from the age at which they leave high school, ai,
until the deterministic retirement age A = 65, they make four choices:
• Labor supply, which can be full time work (hf ∈ {0, 1}), part time work (hp ∈ {0, 1}), or not partici-
pating in the labor market. h is a vector that contains the indicators hp and hf .
• School attendance for college or graduate school (s ∈ {0, 1}).
• Which contraceptive method to use, if any. The variables dbck ∈ {0, 1} indicate that method k is
chosen. The vector bc contains all these indicator variables.
• Whether to get an abortion or not (ab ∈ {0, 1}) if a pregnancy occurs.
I assume schooling choices are only made until age 30. Pregnancies can only occur until age 44, and thus
the contraceptive method and abortion decisions are only made until that age.
There are two different decision stages within each period. A woman first makes a contraceptive method
choice. After knowing if she has become pregnant or not, she decides on school attendance, labor supply,
and whether to get an abortion or not (if she is pregnant). It is thus convenient to separate the decisions
into two groups according to their timing: the birth control choice, indexed by k, and the mutually exclusive
combinations of other alternatives, indexed by j.
Finally, in each period a woman can be either married, cohabiting, or single. I make the strong simplifying
assumption that this marital status is not a choice and thus evolves over time according to an exogenous
stochastic process.
3.2 Preferences
At each age, a woman receives flow utility Ua given by:
Ua = U(Ca,Na, fa,ha, sa,bca, aba;ηa,νa, type,Ωa) (1)
Where C is consumption; N is a vector containing the number of children in different age groups; and s,
h, bc, and ab indicate the choices described earlier. f takes the value of 1 if a pregnancy occurs and 0
otherwise. ν is a vector of preference shocks for contraceptive methods, η is a vector of preference shocks for
all other choices, and Ωa represents the state space. Finally, type refers to unobserved (in the data) types
13In the empirical implementation, women with a GED are counted as high school graduates.
12
of women, which differ in their preferences over some of the arguments in U(·), as I will describe in more
detail later.
To make the solution and estimation of the model feasible in terms of computation time, I assume U can
be written as:
Ua = Ca + g(Na, fa,ha, sa, aba;ηa, type,Ωa) + e(bca;νa,Ωa)
3.3 Budget constraint
Given the linearity assumption with respect to consumption in the utility function, a woman’s consumption
is equal to her income, net of expenditures in schooling , contraception, and abortion services. Her income
is composed by her earnings, if she is single, or a fraction τh of her husband’s/partner’s and her earnings
combined, when married or cohabiting.14 15
Ca =(1− dma)ywa + dmaτh(ywa + yha )
− sa(T collI {Sa < 16}+ T gradI {Sa ≥ 16})− κaaba −
K∑
k=1
dbckac
bc
k (2)
T coll and T grad are college and graduate school tuition, respectively. κ is the cost of an abortion. cbck
are the monetary costs of the different contraceptive methods. yw are the woman’s earnings and yh are her
husband’s earnings. dm is a variable that indicates if the woman is either married or cohabiting (dm = 1),
or single (dm = 0).
3.4 Wages, labor supply and schooling
The labor market is perfectly competitive. At the beginning of each period, a woman receives wage offers
and decides whether to work part-time, full-time, or not work at all. The wage offers are given by:
woa = r
oΛa(Sa, Ha, type, εa) (3)
where ro is the rental price of human capital, which is different for part-time (o = p) and full-time (o = f)
jobs. Λ is human capital, which is accumulated through schooling Sa and labor market experience Ha and
is subject to an i.i.d. random shock εa in each period. The initial human capital endowment is type-specific.
Schooling at age a is given by:
Sa = 12 +
a−1∑
τ=a
sτ (4)
where I have assumed high school is equivalent to 12 years of school. Labor market experience is measured
in thousands of hours worked after high school. I assume part-time work is one thousand hours per year and
full-time work is two thousand hours in a year. Thus:
14For simplicity, from now on I will refer to both the husband, when married, and the partner, when cohabiting, as husband.
15I {·} is an indicator function that takes the value of 1 if the argument is true and 0 otherwise.
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Ha =
a−1∑
τ=a
(hpτ + 2h
f
τ ) (5)
Given the wage offers and labor supply choices, earnings are then given by (in thousands of dollars):
ywa = h
p
aw
p
a + 2h
f
aw
f
a (6)
3.5 Contraceptive choices, pregnancies and abortions
In each period, a woman first chooses which contraceptive method to use. Even though the number of actual
options available to a woman is quite large, I simplify this decision to allow for only three options: not
using any contraception (k = 0), using a “standard” transitory contraceptive method (k = 1), or choosing
permanent sterilization (k = 2). Each of the two actual contraceptive methods (k > 0) is associated with a
monetary cost cbck and a utility cost ek, which appeared in equations (2) and (1). The latter represents things
like going to doctor’s appointments, going through the procedure, making the trip to the pharmacy, getting
the prescription renewed, the pure dissatisfaction of using the method, side effects, partner’s preferences
over the method, and any other costly activities related to acquiring or using the particular contraceptive
method. Both cbc0 and e0 are normalized to zero.
Choosing sterilization prevents pregnancies perfectly and is irreversible, eliminating the possibility of
having children in any future periods. The probability that a woman becomes pregnant if sterilization has
not been chosen is given by:
Πa = Π(bca, Sa, SXa, a) (7)
Thus, the standard contraceptive method affects the probability of becoming pregnant without elimi-
nating it altogether. Aside from the contraceptive choice, the probability that a woman becomes pregnant
during is a function of her age, schooling, and level of sexual activity (SX), which I will describe in more
detail later. This function Π captures what is known as “typical use” effectiveness of contraception, i.e. the
probability of becoming pregnant when contraception is used as it is normally used rather than following the
instructions perfectly. Thus, the inclusion of schooling as an argument allows for differences by education in
how well contraception is used.
If a pregnancy occurs (f = 1), a woman decides whether to get an abortion or not (ab). Getting an
abortion requires paying monetary and psychic (utility) costs. The monetary cost is composed of the out of
pocket price and the costs incurred by a woman when she needs to travel to obtain an abortion if she does
not live in a county with an abortion provider (loc):
κa = κ0 + κ1(1− loca)
Each woman has an idiosyncratic time-invariant psychic cost of abortion ξ which is drawn from a distri-
bution with a mean that is allowed to differ by type and religiosity.
log(ξ) ∼ N(µξ(rel, type), σ2ξ )
If a woman resides in a state where there are mandatory counseling laws (rega), her psychic costs increase
by an amount χ, which captures the burden imposed by these restrictions.
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Finally, miscarriages may occur after the abortion decision has been made. Thus, if a pregnant woman
decides to carry on with her pregnancy, a child will be born in the next period with probability qMC –
miscarriages (mc) occur with probability (1 − qMC). The contraceptive and abortion decisions, together
with the pregnancy and miscarriage outcomes, determine the evolution of three key state variables: the
presence of a new born child (n), the number of children between the ages of 1 and 5 (N5), and the number
of children between the ages of 6 and 17 (N17).
na+1 = fa(1− aba)(1−mca)
N5a+1 =
a−1∑
τ=a−5
nτ
N17a+1 =
a−6∑
τ=a−17
nτ (8)
I assume children age 18 and older have no effect on the decisions in the model.
3.6 Exogenous state variables
Local conditions There are two state variables that summarize the local conditions that affect the costs
faced by a woman when obtaining an abortion: if there is a provider in the county in which she lives (loc)
and if the state in which she lives imposes mandatory counseling and waiting period laws (reg). I assume
that loc evolves according to a markov processes qloc. With respect to reg, I assume there are two types of
states: states that may impose these laws and and states that never impose these laws. I do this to correctly
represent the data. Thus rega indicates if the state in which the woman lives has mandatory counseling
restrictions at that time, while regtype indicates the if the state is of the type that imposes or may impose
these restrictions in the future. For states that may impose these restrictions but have not done so by the
current period, the probability that they will impose mandatory counseling restriction in the next period is
given by P (rega+1 = 1|rega = 0, regtype = 1) = qreg. To correctly represent the data, I also assume that
reg = 1 is an absorbing state.
Marital Status There are three possible marital status in the model: single, cohabiting and married. As
mentioned earlier, I assume that the transitions between these states are exogenous. At the beginning of
each period, the woman is revealed her marital status. The probability distribution over the three possible
marital status at age a+ 1 is a function of a subset of the state space variables:
P (Ma+1|Ωa) = qM (a,Ma, dur(Ma), Sa, sa.type)
where dur(Ma) is the amount of time accumulated in the current marital status. Husbands provide income
to the household, which follows an exogenous process:
yha = y
h(a, ϕa, ε
h
a) (9)
In the first period when she becomes married or cohabiting after being single, the woman draws her
husband’s permanent component of earnings (ϕ), which remains constant as long as the relationship survives
(i.e. as long as she remains cohabiting or married). The mean of the distribution from which ϕ is drawn
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depends on the woman’s schooling and type:16
ϕa ∼ N(µϕ(Sa, type), σ2ϕ)
Sexual activity initiation Not all women start their sexual life at the same time. Clearly, if sexual
initiation has not occurred, the contraceptive use and abortion decisions are not relevant and should not
be included in the woman’s choice set. Therefore, an indicator for sexual initiation (si) is included as a
state variable. A single woman of age a who is not sexually active yet will become sexually active with
probability P (sia+1 = 1|sia = 0) = qsi(a, type). I assume si = 1 for all women who are or have been married
or cohabiting.
Sexual activity Recall the level of sexual activity SX is an argument in the probability that a woman
becomes pregnant (equation (7)). I assume this variable can fall into one of three categories: low, medium
or high. SX evolves stochastically, with the probability distribution over the different levels being a function
of age, marital status and unobserved type:
P (SXa|Ωa) = qSX(a, dma, type)
3.7 Pre-determined heterogeneity
Initial conditions At the beginning of the modeling period, women differ in terms of their religiosity, the
age at which they finish high school, and a series of state variables at the time they finish high school: sexual
initiation, the county and state where they live and if they have ever had any children.
Unobserved heterogeneity Besides this heterogeniety, I assume that women have some relevant char-
acteristics that are unobservable in the data. Following the standard approach in the literature (Heckman
and Singer (1984), Keane and Wolpin (2001)), and as I have hinted repeatedly while describing the model, I
divide women in L different unobserved types, with L = 4. These types differ in terms of their initial human
capital -and hence wage offers-, the expected earnings of their husbands, the probability distribution over
marital status and sexual behavior, and their preferences for abortion, leisure and school attendance.
The distribution of women over these types depends on the other initial conditions X:
P (type|X) = qtype(a, na, loca, regtypea, sia)
3.8 Timing
Within each period, the timing of events is the following:
1. Preference and wage shocks are realized. Marital status and sexual activity are realized. Children are
born.
2. Women make contraceptive choices.
3. Pregnancies occur.
4. Conditional on the pregnancy status, women make all other choices (if applicable): schooling, labor
supply and abortion.
16The age subscript in ϕa refers to the fact that it changes if women divorce or separate and start a new relationship. ϕ is
fixed within a marital relationship.
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3.9 State space
Based on all of the above, a woman’s state space (Ω) is composed by:
• Schooling (Sa) and labor market experience (Ha).
• School attendance (sa−1) and labor supply (ha−1) in the previous period.
• Marital status (Ma).
• If married or cohabiting: duration (dur(Ma)) in the current marital status and permanent earnings
component of the husband (ϕa).
• Number of children in each age group (na, N5a , N17a ).
• Sexual activity status (both initiation sia and level of sexual activity SXa).
• If the woman has chosen a sterilization before.
• Idiosyncratic disutility for abortions (ξ), local availability of abortion services loca, and current manda-
tory counseling regulation in the state in which she lives rega.
• Unobserved type.
3.10 The problem
At each age, a woman in the model is assumed to maximize the present value of expected lifetime utility
from that age onward. Her value function (i.e. the maximized present value of her expected lifetime utility)
is then:
Va(Ωa) = maxE
[
A∑
τ=a
βτ−aUτ (·)|Ωa
]
(10)
The expectation in (10) is taken over current and future pregnancies and miscarriages, the distribution
of future preference shocks, and the probability distribution over the transition of state variables (sexual
initiation, marital status, sexual activity status). The problem can be re-written in a dynamic programming
framework, expressing the value function as the maximum over alternative specific value functions. For this,
given the assumptions on U , the flow utility can be separated into a part that depends on the birth control
choice (B) and another one that depends on the combination of other alternatives U˜ .17 Thus, the Bellman
equation can be written as:
Va(Ωa) = max
k∈CHKa (Ωa)
Πk(Ωa)W
1
k (Ωa) + (1−Πk(Ωa))W 0k (Ωa) +Bka(Ωa) (11)
where
W fk = max
j∈CHJa (Ωa,f)
˜
U ja + βE
[
Va+1(Ωa+1)|dja = 1, dbcka = 1, f,Ωa
]
(12)
W fk is the value function at the time of pregnancy, given the pregnancy status and the contraceptive
choice k. The combination of abortion, schooling and labor supply choices (j) is indicated by dja = 1. CH
J
and CHK are the choice sets for the j-indexed and k-indexed alternatives, respectively. The continuation
value at age A, VA+1, is assumed to be zero.
17Bk = −(ek + cbck ) while U˜j = gj +Cj + cbck . The j and k indexes in ek, gj and Cj denote that these functions are evaluated
when the respective alternative (j and k) is chosen.
17
3.11 Solution of the model
I solve the model by backwards recursion. At each age and point in the state space, I integrate over all the
random outcomes to build the expectation over the continuation values (which I will refer to as Emax). For
this, I need to integrate over 3 birth control preference shocks (ν’s), 4 other preference shocks (η’s) and 2
wage and income shocks (ε’s). This is done through a combination of a distributional assumption on the ν’s
and numerical integration over η’s and ε’s. I also need to integrate over the discrete variables in the state
space that evolve stochastically (SX, si, mc, M) for which I use the actual discrete probability distributions.
For the Emax function, I take D draws of the η’s and ε’s from their respective joint distributions.
Conditional on each draw d of these shocks , I build W 1d and W
0
d value functions according to equation (12).
Then, I calculate the expected value of equation (11) (the expectation is over the distribution of the birth
control preference shocks) to build the expected value function for draw d. I then average over the D draws
to calculate the value of the Emax at age a.
Because the state space is too large, solving the model at every state space point is computationally
unfeasible. Thus, I approximate the Emax function in the same way as Keane and Wolpin (2001). At each
age, I solve the model for a random sample of the state space points, where every feasible combination of
state variables is drawn with the same probability. Then, I regress the Emax values on a function of the
state variables that includes linear, quadratic, and interaction terms. When moving back to the previous
period, I interpolate the Emax function using the coefficients of the regression I previously estimated. I
finally integrate over all the possible transitions, as described before, to build the appropriate continuation
values to solve the model in the current period’s random sample of state space points.
4 Data
4.1 NLSY97
To estimate the model, I use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97). The
NLSY97 follows a nationally representative sample of young men and women living in the United States and
born between 1980 and 1984. From the original sample, 4384 respondents are female.18 The first round of
interviews took place in 1997 and the respondents have been followed ever since through yearly interviews.
To date, the last round of information that has been released is round 15, corresponding to survey year 2011.
The NLSY97 asks questions and gathers detailed information on the labor market, fertility outcomes,
sexuality, and socio-demographic characteristics, which I use to build most of the variables that appear in
the model. In particular, the following information is available for some or all of the rounds of the survey:
• Detailed weekly employment histories.
• Detailed monthly marriage and cohabitation histories.
• Information on all pregnancies and outcomes, including miscarriages and induced abortions.
• Whether a person has ever had sex or not, and the amount of sexual activity in the last year if she
has.
• The contraceptive method used, if any, and the fraction of sexual relations in which a contraceptive
method was used.
• Earnings during the previous year.
• Income of the husband/partner during the previous year.
18This includes the main sample and the additional over-sampling of hispanic and black respondents.
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• School enrollment and achievement.
• Detailed geographic information (only available in the confidential ‘Geocode’ version of the data).
The timing period in the model is a year (age of the woman). I assume that each period in the data starts
in September given that the modeling period needs to coincide with the academic calendar. All variables
are built according to this timing.
Abortions, pregnancies and miscarriages The NLSY97 asks questions about the outcomes of preg-
nancies and, if pregnancies did not end in a live birth, what was the exact outcome of the pregnancy. It also
asks the date of birth for children born to the woman. Using the dates reported for abortions, I first define
the period in which these occur and assume the pregnancy happened in the same period. Then, using the
birth dates, I define when a child was born and assume the pregnancy occurred in the period immediately
before. In the event that both of these end up defining the pregnancies in the same period, given that the
model allows for at most one pregnancy per year, I give priority to the abortion date and assume that birth
occurred in the period immediately after the one originally defined, adjusting the corresponding pregnancy
accordingly. Finally, miscarriages are defined using the same variable as abortions, but are defined last, only
recording them when there is no pregnancy ending in birth or abortion during the period.
The questions about pregnancies not ending in live births are asked in a self-administered part of the
survey. This is done to reduce misreporting of sensitive issues such as abortion. Nevertheless, it is clear
that many abortions are still misreported (either as non-pregnancies or as miscarriages). When I compare
abortion rates by age groups calculated from the NLSY97 with those coming from the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) in 2005 (Ventura et al., 2009) and the Guttmacher Institute (GI) (Jones and
Kavanaugh, 2011), I find that, for women ages 20−24, only 47% of the abortions are reported. This fraction
goes down to 33% for women ages 25 − 29. These estimates are almost identical to the ones obtained by
Jones and Kost (2007) using a different but similar self-reported survey (NSFG). This is, of course, a crucial
issue for this paper. Thus, in section 5.1 I will carefully describe how I incorporate these measures of the
degree of misreporting, constructed using aggregate abortion rates, into the estimation procedure I use.
Contraception NLSY97 questions include up to 15 different contraceptive method options. I group this
into the three categories (including no method at all) described earlier. I classify a woman as using standard
contraception if she chooses a “modern” contraceptive method (i.e. excluding options like withdrawal or
calendar based methods) and she reported that the fraction of times it was used was at least 80%.
School attendance To build the school attendance variable, I first use the information on schooling
achievement and classify a woman as having attended school for a year if she reports a one year increase in
the highest grade achieved. This implies that I only consider attendance that leads to completion of a full
academic year. In this way, women who attend part of the year are assumed to not attend at all. For women
that miss an interview or women who report an inconsistent increase (e.g. 3 year jump in one year), I use
attendance reports and achievement at later ages, if available, to recover the information.
Labor supply The total number of hours worked is calculated directly from employment histories. I define
working more than 1500 hours in a given year as full time work, working between 500 and 1500 hours as
part-time, and working under 500 hours as no work at all.
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Initial age Women in the estimation sample leave high school when they are between 17 and 20 years
of age. I assume that the initial age can take only one of two values, 18 or 19, and will treat women who
left high school at 17 as if they were 18. Similarly, women who were 20 are classified as being 19. I do
this to ensure that enough women in my sample fall into each possible combination of values for the initial
conditions.
Initial number of children A very small fraction of the sample (0.91%) have more than one child at
the time of high school graduation. I assume that these women have only one child. Thus, women can have
either one or no children at the beginning of the modeling period.
Religiosity The NLSY97 asks three questions that capture how religious the respondent is in some, but
not all, of the rounds.19 I use this information to classify women in three different groups which I denote as
“Low”, “Medium” and “High”. I make the simplifying assumption that religiosity doesn’t change over time,
and thus I use the information for 2005 to categorize the respondents.20
4.2 Guttmacher Institute Census of Abortion Providers and policy reports
Provider availability The Guttmacher Institute (GI) collects different kinds of information regarding
abortion patients and providers on a regular basis. In particular, GI carries on a periodical census of abortion
providers and surveys a sample of them and their patients. This allows the GI to collect information on
virtually all abortion service providers in the U.S. and some aggregate characteristics of their patients. Using
this information I am able to define which counties in the U.S. have an abortion provider and which ones do
not. I only consider abortion providers handling more than 400 cases per year. These providers accounted
for more than 94% of abortions in the U.S. in 2008 (Jones and Kooistra, 2011). Most importantly, most of
the smaller providers (from which around a third have less than 30 cases per year) are not listed in yellow
pages and are not easily accessible to most women. The census of abortion providers was not carried out
every year during my sample period. Thus, I only have information on provider availability for the the
following years: 2000, 2004, 2005, 2007 and 2008.
Mandatory counseling regulation The GI also publishes reports on state policies regarding abortion
every six months.21 I use the information from these reports, supplemented with information on laws directly
available from NARAL Pro-choice or the laws themselves, to define which states had implemented mandatory
counseling laws in any given year.22
Connecting geographical information with NLSY97 data Finally, I use these geographical informa-
tion and the Geocode version of the NLSY97, which provides the location of each respondent, to define which
women live in a state with mandatory counseling regulation and in a county with or without a provider at
any given point in time.
192002, 2005, 2006 and 2008.
20I use other years’ answers if the information is not available in 2005 for a particular woman.
21The series of reports, the most recent of which are available in the Guttmacher Institute’s website, are called “State Policies
in Brief”.
22NARAL Pro-choice, formerly known only as NARAL, is an advocacy group that opposes regulation of abortion services.
Their web page provides extensive information about abortion laws that is publicly available.
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4.3 Out of pocket cost of contraception and abortion
Because of the linearity in consumption, intercepts in the utility function cannot be separately identified
from monetary costs in the budget constraint. Thus, I use average prices for contraceptive methods and
abortion to assign values to the monetary costs.23
• The monetary out of pocket cost of an abortion κ0 is set to $470, the median price reported in Jones
and Kooistra (2011) which comes from the GI census of abortion providers. This price has been fairly
stable during the sample period, as presented by (Beauchamp, 2012).
• The cost of standard contraception (k = 1) is set at $360. In the NLSY97 sample, from the women I
categorize as using this method, the majority uses the contraceptive pill, with most of the remainder
using condoms only. This is consistent with the patterns presented earlier in Table 2. Therefore, I
set the value for this parameter based on the prices of contraceptive pills. Contraceptive pill prices
range between $15 and $50 per month out of pocket (Planned Parenthood). Assuming a cost of $30
per month, the annual cost of this methods is $360.
• The cost of a sterilization is calculated to be between $1500 and $6000 (Planned Parenthood), and this
cost is paid once. Based on these estimates, I set cbc2 = $4000.
4.4 Sample selection
As I mentioned earlier, I restrict my attention to women who are high school graduates (84.3% of the NLYS97
sample). Therefore, this is the first criterion of selection of the sub-sample that I use to estimate the model.
I also drop from the sample women who are high school graduates but graduated after the year in which they
turned 20 or before the year in which they turned 17. I do this for two reasons. First, as age at graduation
is one of the initial conditions in the model, the small number of women graduating at these ages becomes
an issue for the estimation of the distribution of initial characteristics and the identification of the model’s
parameters and the distribution over unobserved types (i.e. there would not be enough variation conditional
on initial characteristics). Furthermore, these women are potentially different from all other in unobserved
ways that I cannot control for, even after allowing unobserved heterogeneity to be correlated with the age
at graduation and other initial conditions. Table 3 shows the number of observations lost at each stage of
the sample selection process.
Table 3: Observations dropped at each stage of sample selection
Reason Dropped Remaining
Not a high school graduate/ No GED 684 3700
Graduated from High School before 17 14 3686
Graduated from High School after 20 163 3523
4.5 Descriptive statistics
Table 4 describes the data in terms of the initial conditions of the model: age, presence of children, sexual
initiation, availability of an abortion provider in the county of residence at the time of graduation, if the
state in which they live at this age ever imposes mandatory counseling regulation and religiosity.
23Setting these costs in this way has clearly no effect on the estimation of the model. They are only relevant as guidelines
when performing counterfactuals.
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Table 4: Distribution of initial conditions
Age finished high school
18 64%
19 36%
Religiosity
Low 32%
Medium 51%
High 16%
At initial age
Has children 13%
Has initiated her sexual life 77%
Lives in a county with abortion provider 54%
Lives in a state that ever imposes mandatory counseling 49%
Lives in a state with mandatory counseling 29%
Table 5: Pregnancy and choice distributions, by age
Pregnant Abortion Enrolled Working Birth control
Age Part time Full time No Standard Sterilization
18 0.11 0.016 0.58 0.43 0.22 0.35 0.64 0.00
19 0.11 0.019 0.49 0.42 0.28 0.42 0.58 0.00
20 0.12 0.018 0.43 0.39 0.35 0.48 0.52 0.00
21 0.13 0.013 0.37 0.37 0.39 0.51 0.49 0.00
22 0.13 0.017 0.25 0.29 0.49 0.54 0.46 0.00
23 0.13 0.013 0.17 0.24 0.56 0.56 0.43 0.00
24 0.12 0.009 0.15 0.22 0.59 0.56 0.44 0.00
25 0.12 0.007 0.13 0.20 0.59 0.56 0.43 0.00
26 0.11 0.011 0.11 0.19 0.59 0.56 0.44 0.01
27 0.11 0.007 0.12 0.20 0.59 0.55 0.44 0.02
28 0.10 0.007 0.11 0.18 0.58 0.55 0.42 0.03
29 0.07 0.002 0.11 0.19 0.57 0.57 0.39 0.04
30 0.04 0.004 0.11 0.18 0.59 0.55 0.39 0.06
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Table 5 presents the fraction of women who had a pregnancy and the choice probabilities for the decisions
in the model, conditional on age. Some patterns are worth noting. First, although most of the school
enrollment occurs in the late teens and early twenties, a significant fraction of women continue to be enrolled
up to age 30. As age increases, women also tend to switch from part time to full time jobs. Part of this is due
to many women taking part time jobs while they study. The age profile of contraceptive use follows a similar
pattern as the one presented earlier in Table 2. With age, women tend to substitute standard contraceptive
methods for permanent sterilization. Consistent with the information presented in Table 1, abortions (and
pregnancies) are most prevalent in the early twenties.
Finally, Table 6 presents the distribution of some state variables conditional on age. By age 30 the average
woman has accumulated 14.6 years of schooling and 40% of women have at least four years of college. Average
labor market experience is 15 thousand hours of work (Column 4). The next four columns show the fraction
of women living in each of the four kinds of locations, defined according to the state-specific regulation and
the availability of an abortion provider in county. The changes in the distribution of location types as women
in the sample get older reflect the changes over time in mandatory counseling restrictions imposed by states
and provider availability at the county level. The number of states with mandatory counseling laws increased
from 12 to 25 between 1997 and 2011 (sample period). Of the 258 counties with a provider in 2000 (the first
year for which I have these data), 19 (7%) did not have one in 2008. 23 counties without a provider in 2000
had one in 2008.24 With respect to marital status, cohabitation is more frequent than marriage at younger
ages. However, marriage becomes increasingly frequent as age increases and becomes more common than
cohabitation by age 24. Finally, the mid-twenties are the ages at which more women have children. The
number of children ages 1 to 5 and 6 to 17 increase accordingly.
5 Estimation
I estimate the model by Simulated Maximum Likelihood (SML). To build the likelihood function, I follow
the approach introduced by Keane and Wolpin (2001) and formalized in Keane and Sauer (2010), in which
unconditional probabilities are used to construct the likelihood. The reasons for following this approach are
twofold. First, because the dimension of the shock vector is too large, and because of the way in which the
shocks enter the utility function, it is virtually impossible to define the thresholds required for the choice
probabilities and thus to use a smooth unbiased simulator as, for example, GHK. Also, because some women
leave the sample during some periods, there are some state variables (the ones that are not collected through
event histories) that are not observed in some periods. To use conditional simulations, I would need to drop
these women from my sample or integrate over all possible transitions of state variables when these are not
observed.
Unconditional simulations of each woman’s contribution to the likelihood require the plausible assumption
of measurement error in all outcome variables, as well as the specification of a stochastic process for each one
of these variables. This is particularly useful in this paper because it provides a natural way to address the
crucial issue of abortion underreporting, as I will present in detail in the next section. I will not describe this
SML methodology in full detail here (a complete description can be found in Keane and Wolpin (2001) and
Keane and Sauer (2010)). The basic idea is to simulate full histories (sequences of choices and outcomes) for
each woman at each iteration, based on the current value of the parameter vector. The contribution to the
24For the purpose of showing the age distribution of local conditions in Table 5, I have assumed that provider conditions
remain constant and equal to the last year available when the information is missing.
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likelihood is built based on a frequency simulator of the full sequence of decisions, rather than the choices at
a point in time conditional on the state space. Because of the large amount of choices and periods, as well
as the fact that some outcome variables are continuous (e.g. wages), the probability of a simulated history
and an observed one coinciding is zero. The measurement error assumption directly provides non-degenerate
probability assessments of the likelihood of a simulated story being the same as the observed one. The
simulated likelihood for each individual is then calculated as the mean over all of these likelihood objects
relating a particular simulated history to the data.
As it is standard, I assume that the measurement error in all outcomes, except for abortions and all other
fertility outcomes, is unbiased. The specifics on these unbiased error processes can be found in Appendix B.
5.1 Biased misreporting of abortions
As described in Section 4, the degree of misreporting of abortions is substantial in the NLSY97 data. Also,
as introduced in the previous section, the SML procedure I use for estimation requires the assumption that
all outcomes are measured with error in the data. Thus, this characteristic of the estimation procedure fits
quite nicely with the misreporting problem and provides a natural way to address it.
Pregnancies, abortions, miscarriages, and births are not independent events. Thus, a single measurement
error process needs to be specified for these events jointly. I assume that these fertility related outcomes
in the model are misreported with bias. Although previous research using the same estimation procedure
has assumed that the measurement error process for the observed outcomes is unbiased (e.g. Keane and
Wolpin (2001, 2010)), this is by no means necessary, as put forward in Keane and Sauer (2010). Thus, in
this section I define the characteristics of the biased measurement error process for the fertility variables and
propose how to include measures of aggregate abortion rates to aid in the identification of the parameters of
this process (and therefore the parameters of the model). In what follows, I drop the age subscript to make
notation easier.
There are four possible fertility outcomes, which stem from the feasible combinations of f , ab, mc and
n: no pregnancy, abortion, miscarriage and a birth. I specify the measurement error process in terms of
indicators for each of these outcomes: np, ab, mc, and b, respectively. Throughout this section, x˜ will denote
a reported variable, given the measurement error process, while x will denote the true one, given the model.
Let pij,k ≡ Prob(k˜ = 1|j = 1). For example, piab,np = Prob(n˜p = 1|ab = 1), the probability of no pregnancy
being reported given an abortion occurred. These pij,k’s are the measurement error parameters, which are
contained in the 4× 4 matrix Πfer. Denote also Pj ≡ Prob(j = 1) and P˜j ≡ Prob(j˜ = 1). For instance, Pab
is the frequency of abortions predicted by the model, while P˜ab is the frequency of reported abortions, given
the predictions of the model and the measurement error process.
If the measurement error process were unbiased, then Pj = P˜j for all of these outcomes. Imposing this
restriction would make all of the probabilities functions of only one parameter and the observed frequencies
of the outcomes.25 However, in this biased case where there is no imposed relationship between Pj and
P˜j , the pij,k’s are, in principle, allowed to move “freely”. This doesn’t prevent the identification conditions
presented in Haussman et al. (1998) from being satisfied. However, given the strong bias in the abortion
reports, one would want to add information that would help with the identification of these measurement
error rates (and thus the model’s parameters). This can be done by including “true” aggregate abortion
rates from external sources in the estimation. The way in which I include these rates follows the same idea
as the unbiased measurement error process: I impose a restriction on the relationship between Pab and P˜ab.
25See Appendix B for the details on this standard unbiased case.
25
Given the measurement error process, we have:
P˜ab = piab,abPab + pinp,abPnp + pimc,abPmc + pib,abPb
Divide by Pab on both sides to get:
P˜ab
Pab
= piab,ab +
pinp,abPnp + pimc,abPmc + pib,abPb
Pab
(13)
Now, let ρ be the ratio of the observed frequencies of abortion in the NLSY97 to aggregate abortion
rates from the CDC and the GI. These aggregate rates are obtained directly from abortion provider reports
instead of survey data. The restriction I impose is simply that:
P˜ab
Pab
= ρ
Thus, from equation (13) above we get:
ρ = piab,ab +
pinp,abPnp + pimc,abPmc + pib,abPb
Pab
(14)
Rearranging this we have:
piab,ab = ρ− pinp,abPnp + pimc,abPmc + pib,abPb
Pab
(15)
making one of the parameters in Πfer a function of other parameters and ρ.
Because of the joint nature of the fertility outcomes, outcomes other than abortions are misreported
with bias. This is captured by the fact that the measurement error process is defined for all the outcomes
jointly. However, for the purpose of the main question in this paper, it is unnecessary to assume that there
exists bias in the report of pregnancies or miscarriages aside from the one that comes from the misreporting
of abortions. In other words, in the absence of the underreporting of abortions, the observed pregnancy,
miscarriage and birth frequencies would be unbiased estimators of the true pregnancy, miscarriage and birth
probabilities. Thus, I nest the biased measurement error process in an unbiased one, similar to the one
defined for all outcomes other than the fertility ones. This allows me to write:
pij,j = E
fer + (1− Efer)Pj
pij,k = (1− Efer)Pk for j 6= ab (16)
Where Efer is a parameter controlling the degree of unbiased misclassification error that needs to be esti-
mated. This only leaves the probabilities piab,k’s, which determine the fraction of abortions reported as some
other outcome k, to be specified. In the absence of bias, these would be given by equation (16). However,
the bias “adds” a share 1 − ρ that gets reported as the remaining three outcomes. I first assume that no
abortion gets reported as an actual birth aside from those that would occur if the process were unbiased:
piab,b = (1− Efer)Pb
A fraction λ of the biased reports will get reported as miscarriages, while the remaining 1 − λ will be
reported as if there had been no pregnancy. I assume λ = 1− qmc. This means that when deciding how to
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report an abortion (that won’t get reported as one), women report them as miscarriages at the same rate
that miscarriages actually occur. Explicitly:
piab,mc = (1− Efer)Pmc + (1− qmc)(1− ρ)
piab,np = (1− Efer)Pnp + qmc(1− ρ) (17)
I assume that the level of underreporting of abortions (ρ) varies with age. As I mentioned in section 4,
the fraction of reported abortions for women 20− 24 is 47% and this number goes down to 33% for women
25− 29 years old. These fractions are precisely the ρ’s in equation (15).26
6 Results
The objects of interest for the analysis in this paper are the choice patterns and behaviors predicted by
the model as a whole, rather than the estimated values for the parameters themselves. These behavioral
predictions are obtained by simulating the model at the estimated parameters. Therefore, I do not include
the full set of parameter estimates here and refer the reader to Appendix C for these and their corresponding
standard errors. Before turning to the counterfactual policy simulation that constitutes the key component
of the analysis, I first (1) present the predictions of the model with respect to the choices and outcomes
of interest and assess how they fit the data, (2) characterize the choice patterns of the unobserved types,
given the parameter estimates, as this heterogeneity is crucial for the analysis of the effects of the simulated
policies, (3) briefly describe the abortion costs implied by the parameter estimates, and (4) present the
distribution of the willingness to pay for an abortion across the population, as it is useful for explaining
several of the results of the policy simulation.
When analyzing the effects of policies and characterizing the behaviors predicted by the model, I will
focus most of my attention on choice patterns for women ages 18 to 30, together with life-time outcomes
(e.g. fertility, earnings, welfare).27
6.1 Model fit
Figures 2 - 4 graph the observed choice probabilities for the four choices in the model and the pregnancy
outcome (abortions and pregnancies are presented as rates per 1000 women). The relevant comparison,
in terms of fit, for the abortion and pregnancy rates are the implied “observed” rates, given the biased
measurement error process (labeled as “Model-reported”). However, Figure 2 includes the predicted rates
as well for reference purposes. The implied reported abortion rate fits the data pretty well. The actual
abortion rate, which by construction is larger than reported rate, is consistent with aggregate abortion rates,
although it slightly over predicts abortions in the late twenties. The model also predicts the pregnancy rate
accurately.28 With respect to contraceptive choices, the model predicts the age patterns fairly well. However,
26To avoid discontinuities caused by the jump between these two different ρ’s, I implement a smoothing procedure. Details
can be found in the Appendix.
27I will refer to women ages 18-30 as young women.
28The observed drop in the pregnancy rate at ages 29 and 30 in the data is specific to this data set and is mainly due to two
particular facts: (i)the number of women observed at later ages is dramatically lower as only the older women within the cohort
are observed at that age (making any estimate very imprecise) and (ii) the NLSY97 asks about ALL previous pregnancies in
each interview, so the probability that a pregnancy gets reported increases with the distance between the pregnancy date and
the date of the most recent interview. Due to the small number of women at this age in the sample, this has virtually no effect
27
the model predicts a slower increase in sterilization use. Schooling and labor supply choices are predicted
very well by the model.
Ideally, one would want to validate the model by comparing its predictions to statistics that do not
come from the estimation sample. However, this is not possible in the context of this paper. Holding out a
non-random part of the sample as in Keane and Wolpin (2007), for instance, would reduce the number of
abortions in the estimation sample. Given that I already need to deal with underreporting of abortions, this
is not a feasible option. A second-best option would be to compare the predictions of the model in terms of
the effects of policies that I observe in the data to estimates from other studies. Although this would still
be an evaluation within sample (I use that information in the estimation), matching those estimates would
provide some validation to the model. Unfortunately, all of the reliable estimates from the literature are for
(i) a cross-section of women rather than a specific cohort and (ii) a specific state rather than the U.S. as a
whole. Nevertheless, in the discussion of the results of the conuterfactual policy analysis I relate my results
to what has been found in the literature, showing that both are consistent with each other.
Figure 2: Abortion and Pregnancy rates (per 1000 women)
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Figure 3: Contraceptive choices probabilities
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Figure 4: School attendance and labor supply probabilities
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6.2 Characterization of unobserved types
Table 7 characterizes the four unobserved types according to their choice patterns, marital status profiles,
college graduation rates, and life-time fertility. It also presents the initial human capital (i.e., the intercept
in their wage offer function) and the mean psychic cost ξ for each type, which already takes into account
the differences in religiosity across types. It is worth noting, however, that the differences in choices across
types depend on several more elements in the model, as described in section 3. Yet, this characterization
summarizes the key differences between them.
The types in Table 7 are ordered from the highest to the lowest in terms of initial human capital. Types 1
and 2 can be thought of as the high ability types (high wage offers, everything else constant), whereas Types
3 and 4 are the lower ability types. However, the initial human capital of Type 3 women is still significantly
higher than the one of those of Type 4. The share of women who graduate from college is nearly 75% for the
first two types, while virtually none of the women of Type 3 or 4 finish college. Thus, I will refer to these
two groups of types as the college and non-college types, respectively.
Regarding labor supply, the most noticeable difference is between Type 4 women and all the other types.
Very few women of this type work and, when they do, they mostly work part-time jobs. Type 3 women –
the other non-college type – display a a contrasting labor supply behavior. More than two thirds of them
work at any age and most of them work full-time jobs. The majority of women of both of the college types
works although women of Type 2 choose to work full-time more frequently than women of Type 1. For both
of these types, there is a large switch from part-time to full-time jobs between the “college years” – ages
18-24 – and the late twenties.
Finally, with respect to reproductive choices, Type 1 women have a relatively low abortion rate and a
slightly higher rate of contraceptive use when compared to the other college type. This is consistent with
the difference in mean psychic costs for women both of these types, as the average cost for Type 1 women
is almost three times as large as the one of Type 2 women. Even though the average psychic cost for Type
4 women is one fourth of the cost of Type 1 women, their abortion rate is the lowest of all types at younger
ages and very similar to the rate of Type 1 women in the late twenties. Type 2 women have the highest
abortion rate of all types at ages 18-24, while Type 3 women are the group with the highest rate at ages
25-30. Contraceptive use is frequent and similar for both of the college types and higher for these women
than for those of the non-college types. However, nearly 40% of women of Type 3 use contraception, which
contrasts with the usage among Type 4 women (less than 10%). As a result of all these choices, the total
fertility rates – number of children born over the lifetime– are 1, 0.7, 1.6 and 3.3 children per woman for
Types 1 through 4, respectively.
Thus, in order to summarize these patterns in an easier way throughout the discussion, I will refer to
Type 1 women as the college and low abortion rate type; Type 2 women as the college and high abortion
rate type; Type 3 as the non college-working (and high abortion rate) type; and Type 4 women as the
“stay-home” type.
6.3 Abortion and contraception costs
In the model, if a pregnancy occurs, the choice of whether to get an abortion or not is determined by the
relative benefit of preventing a birth at that point in time and the costs incurred when obtaining an abortion.
The relative value of preventing a birth is a function of the woman’s particular characteristics, captured by
the state variables in Ω (see equations (11) and (12)). The costs are composed of the out of pocket cost
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Table 7: Characterization of unobserved types
Type
1 2 3 4
Share 36% 20% 25% 19%
Enrollment
ages 18-24 61% 64% 2% 0%
ages 25-30 19% 23% 0% 0%
Part-time work
ages 18-24 48% 21% 12% 38%
ages 25-30 24% 3% 13% 23%
Full-time work
ages 18-24 31% 49% 66% 0%
ages 25-30 69% 90% 59% 2%
Abortion rate
ages 18-24 25.3 71.1 65.8 1.7
ages 25-30 16.2 47.9 76.5 18.2
Using any contraception
ages 18-24 84% 74% 43% 9%
ages 25-30 67% 59% 34% 7%
Married
at age 25 21% 17% 22% 35%
at age 30 28% 31% 31% 47%
Cohabiting
at age 25 13% 24% 43% 29%
at age 30 13% 20% 39% 25%
College graduate 73% 76% 0% 0%
Number of children 1.0 0.7 1.6 3.3
Mean ξ $ 40,054 $ 14,352 $ 7,579 $ 10,723
Wage intercept 0% -2% -10% -17%
(difference w.r.t. Type 1)
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κ0; the additional “traveling” cost imposed by the lack of provider in the county of residence (κ1) and
mandatory counseling restriction in the state of residence (χ); and the idiosyncratic psychic cost (ξ), drawn
from a distribution in which the mean depends on the unobserved type and the woman’s religiosity. The top
panel of Table 8 summarizes these costs and the differences according to the unobserved type and religiosity.
As it can be seen, most of the costs come from the psychic component. The average psychic cost (ξ)
in the population is $22, 130, which is outstandingly larger than the (imputed) out of pocket cost of $470.
The additional costs imposed by the lack of availability of a provider or the requirement of mandatory
counseling and waiting periods are of the same order of magnitude as these out of pocket costs; $334 and
$326, respectively. Thus, even in the most restrictive case – for a woman living in a state with mandatory
counseling laws and a county without an abortion provider– all of these costs are less than 6% of the average
idiosyncratic psychic cost.
The mean psychic cost for each type is presented holding religiosity fixed at the least religious category.
The qualitative differences already presented in Table 7 still hold. Type 1 women –the college and low
abortion rate type– have a substantially higher cost than all other types, while the non-college working type
have the lowest. There are substantial differences in terms of religiosity, as expected, particularly between
the least religious women and both of the other religiosity categories; the average psychic cost for the least
religious group of women is 43% lower than the one for the most religious women.
The bottom panel of Table 8 shows the imputed out of pocket cost for standard contraception and the
additional psychic cost of this contraceptive method.29 As it can be seen, the psychic costs are of the
same order of magnitude as the out of pocket costs. Compared to the total costs of abortion, the costs of
contraception are less than 10% , even for the type with the lowest psychic cost of abortion.
6.4 The willingness to pay for an abortion
With the estimated model, it is possible to calculate how much a woman would be willing to pay for an
abortion (WP), in excess of all monetary and psychic costs, if she were pregnant. Among women ages 18
to 30, only 32% would be willing to pay a positive amount. These are the women that would choose an
abortion if they became pregnant. However, only a few of them actually do, as the majority do not become
pregnant. Table 9 shows the distribution of WP values among those with a positive WP. The mean WP for
this group of women is $5277. Only 10% of them are willing to pay less than $1088, while 10% are willing
to pay more than $9934.
Two key conclusions can be drawn from these values in Table 9. First, there is substantial heterogeneity
in terms of women who value the option of obtaining an abortion at all –and thus would choose to do so if
they were pregnant– and those who do not. Therefore, any restriction on abortion will have direct effects
on a small subset of the population at any point in time.30 Second, even among those for whom the option
is valuable, there is large variation in how valuable it is. Upon a pregnancy, a majority of women would be
willing to pay relatively large sums of money for an abortion. Comparing these values to the additional costs
imposed by the lack of a provider or mandatory counseling restrictions, shown in Table 8, it can be seen that
the additional costs imposed by restrictions are quite small in relative terms to most women’s willingness to
pay, conditional on pregnancy. Therefore, conditional on pregnancy, these type of restrictions will alter the
abortion decisions of few women.
29The psychic costs of sterilization as these are functions of age, marital status and whether the woman has had children
before or not, which makes it very complicated to clearly summarize them for this Table.
30This statement refers only to “direct” effects, ignoring for the moment that restrictions also have effects by altering lifetime
behaviors and expectations (i.e. the fact that the cost will be higher in the future may alter the value of an abortion today).
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Table 8: Abortion and contraception costs
Abortion costs
Out of pocket (data) $ 470
No provider in county (κ1) $ 334
Mandatory counseling (χ) $ 326
Idiosyncratic cost (ξ)
Mean (Overall) $ 22,130
Mean by type (religiosity=low)
Type 1 $ 31,762
Type 2 $ 10,845
Type 3 $ 6,263
Type 4 $ 8,563
Differences by religiosity (w.r.t. religiosity=low)
Religiosity=medium 40%
Religiosity=high 43%
Standard contraception costs
Out of pocket (data) $ 360
Utility cost (e1) $ 301
Table 9: Willingness to pay
for an abortion (if positive)
Willingness to Pay >0 32%
Mean $ 5,277
Percentile
10 $ 1,088
20 $ 2,137
30 $ 3,116
40 $ 4,002
50 $ 4,908
60 $ 5,916
70 $ 7,082
80 $ 8,356
90 $ 9,934
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6.5 Counterfactual policy simulation
I now explore the effects of a set of counterfactual policies on abortion, contraceptive use and human capital
accumulation decisions. Recall that the analysis, except when noted otherwise, refers to choices for women
ages 18 to 30 and lifetime outcomes. Table 10 summarizes the results of these simulations. The results are
presented in terms of their difference with respect to the baseline scenario (i.e. the predictions of the model
at the estimated parameters). However, because some of these policies affect a specific group of women
instead of the whole population, the baseline is not the same in all cases. For instance, when simulating the
expansion of mandatory counseling restrictions to states which do not currently impose this kind of laws, the
comparison presented in Table 10 refers to women in those states only. Finally, it is worth noting that all of
the effects estimated here are long-run effects as they all assume that (1) all contraceptive decisions are made
after learning about the new policy; (2) women have incorporated the new policy into their expectations
and assume it will remain in place forever ; and (3) the policy is implemented by the time women leave high
school.31
6.5.1 Perfectly enforced ban on abortions
I begin the policy analysis by considering the extreme case of a perfectly enforced ban on abortions. Several
states in the U.S. currently have laws that would automatically ban abortion in the event that Roe v. Wade
were overturned, while others have laws that express the intent to limit abortion to the maximum extent
allowed by the Supreme Court. Laws and amendments to state constitutions that criminalize abortion in
several indirect ways were being discussed or voted on in 2014 in North Dakota, South Dakota and Colorado.32
These laws, together with the observed accumulation of restrictions over the last decades, raise the question
of what the effects would be if this restrictive impulse were enacted to its fullest extent. Clearly, if abortion
were banned at the federal level, it would be extremely unlikely that this could be enforced perfectly. As it
is well known, black markets for abortions exist in countries where abortion is illegal. Unfortunately, there is
nothing in the data that can be used to infer and extrapolate the size of this potential black market, the price
for abortions in that scenario, the cost of risking legal prosecution, or the additional health risks implied by
illegal abortion procedures. Thus, the results from simulating a perfectly enforced ban can only be seen as
an approximation to this scenario, providing valuable information about the importance of the availability
of abortion services for contraceptive choices and human capital accumulation through schooling and labor
supply. Moreover, they can be interpreted as the upper bounds on the effect of restrictions on abortion.
Column 1 in Table 10 presents the results of the simulation of the perfectly enforced ban on abortions.
As a result of the ban, there is a large increase in the use of contraception among young women. The share of
young women using any form of contraception increases by 11.1 percentage points, 10.4 of which correspond
to standard contraception, a 23% increase. This, in turn, reduces the pregnancy rate by 18.6 pregnancies per
1000 women (13%). A comparison between the change in the number of pregnancies and the total number
of abortions predicted in the baseline scenario implies that 47% of the pregnancies ending in abortion are
prevented through increased contraceptive use. The remaining pregnancies are carried to term, increasing
the birth rate for young women by 18.6 births per 1000 women (21% increase). Therefore, each abortion is
replaced by 0.47 additional births.33 Total fertility – the average number of children born to a women in
31This implicitly assumes as well that the behavior of the NLSY97 cohort can be extrapolated to all future cohorts, given
policies and out of pocket costs of abortion and contraception.
32These include “personhood” laws that expand the legal definition of “person” or “child” to include unborn fetus and bills
that would criminalize the dismemberment of an unborn fetus which occurs in a large fraction of surgical abortion procedures.
33The remaining fraction is accounted for by miscarriages.
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Table 10: Counterfactual policies. Differences with respect to baseline.
Counterfactual
Choices and Outcomes Age (1) (2) (3) (4)
Enrolled 18-24 -1.2 -3.3% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.3 1.0%
(ppts.) 25-30 -1.2 -10.3% 0.0 -0.1% 0.0 0.1% 0.1 0.6%
18-30 -1.2 -4.9% 0.0 -0.1% 0.0 0.1% 0.2 0.9%
Part-time work 18-24 -1.0 -3.3% -0.1 -0.3% -0.1 -0.2% 0.5 1.5%
(ppts.) 25-30 -0.6 -3.4% -0.1 -0.4% -0.1 -0.3% 0.4 2.6%
18-30 -0.8 -3.3% -0.1 -0.4% -0.1 -0.2% 0.5 1.8%
Full-time work 18-24 0.3 0.9% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 -0.1%
(ppts.) 25-30 -1.4 -2.5% -0.1 -0.1% -0.1 -0.2% 0.8 1.5%
18-30 -0.5 -1.1% 0.0 -0.1% -0.1 -0.1% 0.4 0.8%
Contraception: no 18-24 -10.5 -24.8% -1.4 -3.2% -1.1 -2.8% -10.6 -25.0%
(ppts.) 25-30 -11.7 -21.5% -1.3 -2.4% -0.7 -1.4% -15.6 -28.8%
18-30 -11.1 -23.0% -1.4 -2.8% -0.9 -2.0% -13.0 -27.0%
Contraception: standard 18-24 10.6 22.1% 1.4 3.1% 1.1 2.2% 11.1 23.2%
(ppts.) 25-30 10.3 23.9% 1.3 3.0% 0.8 1.7% 17.0 39.5%
18-30 10.4 22.9% 1.4 3.1% 0.9 2.0% 13.9 30.5%
Pregnancy rate 18-24 -18.5 -13.2% -2.7 -1.9% -2.1 -1.5% -18.8 -13.4%
(per 1000 women) 25-30 -18.8 -14.1% -2.1 -1.5% -1.1 -0.8% -24.3 -18.3%
18-30 -18.6 -13.6% -2.4 -1.7% -1.6 -1.2% -21.4 -15.7%
Abortion rate 18-24 -40.3 -100.0% -4.1 -8.9% -3.1 -7.6% -13.3 -32.9%
(per 1000 women) 25-30 -38.2 -100.0% -3.3 -7.7% -2.1 -5.7% -16.3 -42.7%
18-30 -39.3 -100.0% -3.7 -8.3% -2.6 -6.8% -14.7 -37.4%
Abortions/Pregnancies 18-24 -28.8 -100.0% -2.3 -7.1% -1.8 -6.0% -6.5 -22.5%
(ppts.) 25-30 -28.7 -100.0% -2.0 -6.3% -1.4 -4.9% -8.6 -29.9%
18-30 -28.7 -100.0% -2.1 -6.7% -1.6 -5.5% -7.4 -25.8%
Birth rate 18-24 19.5 21.8% 1.2 1.3% 0.9 1.0% -5.2 -5.8%
(per 1000 women) 25-30 17.6 20.6% 1.1 1.3% 1.0 1.1% -7.2 -8.5%
18-30 18.6 21.3% 1.2 1.3% 0.9 1.1% -6.2 -7.0%
Accumulated variables
Schooling 25 -0.08 -3.3% 0.00 0.0% 0.00 0.0% 0.02 1.0%
(years) 30 -0.15 -4.9% 0.00 -0.1% 0.00 0.1% 0.03 0.9%
Labor mkt. Experience 30 -230 -1.5% -23 -0.1% -21 -0.1% 152 1.0%
(hours) 65 -642 -1.0% -21 0.0% -17 0.0% 224 0.4%
Total earnings 65 -$20,699 -1.9% -$398 0.0% -$358 0.0% $4,823 0.4%
Children 30 0.24 20.3% 0.01 1.3% 0.01 1.1% -0.08 -6.7%
44 0.42 27.8% 0.01 0.9% 0.01 0.9% -0.19 -12.2%
% Children to single mothers 30 5.44 17.8% 0.15 0.5% 0.05 0.2% 0.11 0.4%
44 4.73 18.6% 0.09 0.4% 0.13 0.5% 1.44 5.7%
% Exactly High School 30 0.43 1.0% 0.01 0.0% 0.02 0.0% -0.21 -0.5%
% Incomplete college 30 1.91 11.8% 0.07 0.4% 0.00 0.0% -0.46 -2.9%
% College grad. or more 30 -2.34 -5.6% -0.08 -0.2% -0.02 0.0% 0.68 1.6%
(1): No abortion.
(2): Mandatory counseling everywhere (results for women in states that do not have Mandatory counseling laws in the baseline).
(3): No provider (results for women living in counties with a provider in the baseline).
(4): Free contraception
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her lifetime– increases by 0.42 (28%). Moreover, there is a larger effect on the birth rates for single women,
increasing the fraction of children born to single mothers by 5.4 percentage points, for women under 30, and
4.73 percentage points overall.
Apart from the quantitative estimates of these effects, two important and complementary conclusions
can be drawn from these results. First, the large degree of substitution between abortion and contraceptive
use, consistent with the limited empirical evidence available (Levine et al., 1996; Levine, 2003), suggests
ample room for policies that would prevent pregnancies that lead to abortions in the first place, for example
by altering the incentives for the use of contraception. The full subsidy on contraception that I simulate at
the end of this section falls into this category. Second, even with this large drop in the risk of pregnancy,
almost half of the women who would have had an abortion if the option were available would now see their
fertility plans altered. This may have effects on other decisions, both directly by altering the opportunity
cost of other activities and indirectly through expectations. I now turn to analyze these effects in terms of
labor market choices and human capital accumulation.
First, notice that the enrollment rate drops by 1.2 percentage points per year between ages 18 and 30.
This lower enrollment decreases the average accumulated schooling after high school by 4.9% (0.15 years).
The share of women with a college degree decreases in a similar way, dropping 2.3 percentage points (5.6%).
The absence of abortion also affects labor supply decisions of young women. For ages 18-24, part-time work
decreases while full-time increases slightly. The decrease in part-time work combines a move towards not
working, for some women, and a substitution from attending school and working part-time to working full-
time, for other women. Therefore, the accumulated labor market experience by age 30 decreases by roughly
1.5%. However, the effect is smaller when looking at labor market experience accumulated throughout the
entire life cycle. On average, women accumulate 640 fewer hours of market experience at age 65, which is 1%
of the average experience. This means that, even if this policy affects labor supply decisions at a particular
point in time (e.g. the fraction of women working at all in their late twenties drops by 1.2 percentage points
per year on average), the effects are not significant at all when looked at from a lifetime perspective. Finally,
average lifetime earnings fall by 2% as a consequence of the changes in schooling and labor supply brought
by the abortion ban.
These effects on human capital and lifetime earnings refer to all women, even those who would have
not had an abortion in the absence of the abortion ban. However, most of the changes in schooling and
labor supply decisions come from women who would have had an abortion if the option were available.
Thus, Table 11 compares the effects on all women with those on the subset – 42% of women– who would
have had at least one abortion in their lives in the absence of the policy (i.e., those who have at least one
abortion in the baseline). Among these women, the share with a college degree decreases by 5.3 percentage
points (14.3%), while accumulated schooling after high school drops by 0.36 years (13.2%). Throughout
their lifetime, women who would have had an abortion work 1567 fewer hours (2.4%), which is equivalent to
3
4 of a full-time year of work. As a result of these changes in schooling and labor supply, the average loss in
lifetime earnings for this subset of women is $50,784 (4.6%).
Table 11 also presents the average effects in terms of human capital and related measures for the abortion
ban, conditioning on the unobserved type. As expected, most of the changes in schooling come from women
of the two college types. The share of women who do not graduate from college due to the ban is equivalent 3
percentage points for Type 1, the low abortion rate type, and 6 percentage points for the high abortion rate
type. With respect to labor supply, the drop is similar for all types except the college and low abortion rate
one, between 700 and 800 hours. This corresponds to only 1% Types 2 and 3, but 3.4% for the stay-home
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type (Type 4). With respect to lifetime earnings, the differences are more pronounced, as these combine the
effects on schooling and labor supply. The average woman of Type 2, the college-educated and low abortion
rate type, earns $45,744 less on average (2.8%) which contrasts with the $6,818 (0.8%) loss for the no-college
working type. For the stay-home type, the small loss of $8,150 corresponds to 3.5% of lifetime earnings.
Although most qualitative differences between types remain when looking at the effects only on women
who would have had an abortion (bottom panel), two interesting changes are worth noting. First, the effects
on labor market experience for Type 1 women are no longer different from those on the other types. Similarly,
the effects on accumulated schooling for this type is roughly the same as for the other college type. This
implies that the effects of the abortion ban on schooling and labor supply decisions of women who would
not have had an abortion is smaller among Type 1 women than women of the other three types. Second,
the effects on the labor supply of the stay-home type (Type 4) become significantly larger than for the other
types, both in absolute and relative terms. Women of this type who would have had an abortion work 2277
fewer hours during their lifetime. Because this type is the one that tends to work the least, this decrease is
equivalent to 8.5% of their total hours worked.
Finally, this counterfactual exercise can also be used to calculate the loss in the net present value of
lifetime utility (LTU) in the absence of abortion. Table 12 presents summary statistics of the distribution
of this loss. Although LTU is measured in dollars, I present the results in terms of the relative loss, as it
provides a better assessment of the size of the effects of the abortion ban. The first column presents statistics
for all women, whereas column 2 presents them for the subset of women who would have had an abortion had
it been available. In the absence of abortion services, the average loss in lifetime utility is 1% for the whole
population and 2% among those who have had an abortion. More than 50% of women experience no loss
at all. Nevertheless, even among those for whom lifetime utility decreases, the median loss is 1.1% of their
lifetime utility. Thus, the distribution is very skewed to the right. When looking at the entire population,
5% experience a loss larger than 6% of their lifetime utility and one out of every hundred women has a loss
larger than 15% of her lifetime utility. These effects are stronger, of course, when restricting to women who
ever have an abortion. For 5% of them, the abortion ban leads to a loss larger than 10% of their lifetime
utility.
6.5.2 Other restrictions
Now, I consider the effects of two particular policies that impose more focused restrictions, which are not
as extreme as the perfectly enforced ban. First, I take a look at the expansion of mandatory counseling
restrictions to the states where these have not been imposed. Note that this is different from asking was the
effect of these policies where they have been imposed, as the characteristics of women in those two sets of
states are potentially different. Second, I indirectly evaluate the effect of supply side restrictions through its
effect on availability of abortion providers at the county level. The results that I present capture the average
consequences of all of the providers in a county closing down across women living in counties that with a
provider. This policy should not be interpreted as the closing down of all abortion providers – that would
take us back to the abortion ban– but rather as the average effect on women who live in a county with a
provider if that provider were no longer there.
Extending mandatory counseling restrictions By 2011, the last year in the sample period, half of the
states had enacted and implemented mandatory counseling and waiting period restrictions (MC). Column
2 of Table 10 presents the effects of the expansion of these types of policies to the states where they had
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Table 11: Abortion ban: Human Capital and Earnings Losses
All women
% with college Schooling Experience Earnings
(ppts.) (years) (hours)
All 2.3 5.6% 0.15 4.9% 642 1.0% $ 20,716 1.9%
Type
1 3.0 4.2% 0.19 3.7% 379 0.5% $ 22,922 1.7%
2 6.1 8.1% 0.39 6.8% 824 1.0% $ 45,744 2.8%
3 0.1 12.1% 0.02 13.0% 819 1.2% $ 6,818 0.8%
4 0.0 - 0.00 0.0% 711 3.4% $ 8,150 3.5%
Women who would have had an abortion (42%)
% with college Schooling Experience Earnings
(ppts.) (years) (hours)
All 5.3 14.3% 0.36 13.2% 1567 2.4% $ 50,784 4.6%
Type
1 10.4 13.8% 0.73 13.5% 1550 2.2% $ 90,363 6.4%
2 11.3 14.9% 0.73 12.9% 1560 1.9% $ 87,452 5.4%
3 0.0 8.4% 0.02 15.1% 1310 1.9% $ 10,402 1.2%
4 0.0 - 0.00 0.0% 2277 8.5% $ 26,102 8.8%
Table 12: Lifetime Utility Loss
All Given abortion in BL
Mean 0.9% 1.9%
Median 0.0% 1.1%
Right tail
Percentile 90 3.6% 6.7%
Percentile 95 6.1% 10.4%
Percentile 99 15.5% 20.4%
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not been imposed at that time. As a result of this additional regulation, both the abortion and pregnancy
rates fall. Among women ages 18-30, abortions decrease by 3.7 abortions per 1000 women and pregnancies
decrease by 2.4 pregnancies per 1000 women. These changes are equivalent to 8.3% and 1.7% reductions,
respectively. The lower pregnancy rate is the consequence of a 1.4 percentage points increase in contraceptive
use. Only 32% of the changes in abortion decisions result in new births, making the group of women who
might alter their schooling and labor supply choices as a result of these restrictions very small. Thus, it is
not surprising that there are no effects of this policy in terms of human capital accumulation.
As mentioned, calculating these effects is not the same as estimating the effect of having imposed manda-
tory counseling in the states where we observed that it was imposed. Because the states where this occurred
are not random, the characteristics of the women living in those states, both observed and unobserved, are
not necessarily the same as for the women living in the remaining states. I compare the estimated effects
on these two groups of states and find a similar relative change in the abortion rate (8.6%). However, the
effect on the states that do not currently impose these restrictions is 34% larger in absolute terms (number
of abortions per 1000 women), as the abortion rate is higher in these states. The effects on contraceptive
use are similar as well. Nevertheless, changes in birth rates between the ages of 18 and 24 would are 54%
larger in the non-mandatory counseling states than in the ones where we these restrictions are observed.
Finally, the effects on abortion rates calculated here are consistent with those obtained by Althaus
and Henshaw (1994) and Joyce et al. (1997) when estimating the (short-run) effects of the introduction of a
mandatory counseling and waiting period law in Mississippi. They estimate a 10% decrease in abortion rates
Even though their results and mine are not exactly comparable, this similarity provides external validation
for the predictions of the model.34
Closing of providers Several states have recently enacted laws that impose strict requirements on abor-
tion providers. Because complying with these requirements is very costly for most abortion clinics, these
laws are expected to have a substantial effect on the availability of abortion services in the states where
they have been enacted. A well known case is a law known as HB2, passed by Texas in 2013, which in-
cludes requirements on the facilities providing abortion services and the doctors who can perform abortions.
The passing of this law was temporarily blocked by an eleven-hour filibuster carried out by Texas senator
Wendy Davis on June 2013, attracting national attention. After the requirement that doctors have admitting
privileges in nearby hospitals went into effect, the number of abortion clinics in Texas went down from 41
to 22 (Grossman et al., 2014). The requirement that clinics meet the standards of Ambulatory Surgical
Centers (ASC) was blocked by an initial ruling by a Federal Judge, an Appeals Court that reversed it, and
a temporary injunction by the Supreme Court. During the few days it went into effect on October 2014,
only 7 of the remaining clinics met the ASC standards and the remaining ones shut down. A law containing
similar requirements was passed by Louisiana in 2014, while several more are pending rulings on lawsuits
that challenged the laws in federal courts in Alabama, Mississippi and Wisconsin.
These laws indirectly affect women who may obtain abortions by affecting the availability of a provider
where they live. In the context of the model, a woman’s cost of obtaining an abortion increases if there is
no abortion provider where she lives. Thus, I simulate the effect of removing the provider for women living
in counties where there is a provider. The effects should be interpreted as the average effects on women
living in these counties if the abortion providers where they live closes down –for any reason– rather than
the effects of closing down a large number or all of the providers.
34There are several reasons why their results are not exactly comparable to mine: they work with a different time period,
their data is from Mississippi residents only, I use data from one cohort alone, and their effects are short-run effects.
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The results are similar to the ones obtained when expanding mandatory counseling restrictions. For the
average woman between the ages of 18 and 30, the probability of obtaining an abortion decreases by 6.8%
(her own “abortion rate” decreases by 2.6 abortions).35 This is partly the result of a 1 percentage point
increase in the use of contraception that leads to a lower number of pregnancies. Of the abortions that do
not occur as a consequence of the providers closing down, 34% of result in new births.
For most women who have abortions in these counties, the closing of the provider simply increases the
costs they face. Around 93% of women who live in a county with a provider and have an abortion would
still travel to another county to obtain an abortion. Of the few abortions that do not occur, 34% of result
in new births. Thus, the lack of provider changes the abortion choice for very few of the women that have
an abortion in the baseline and still become pregnant. A similar conclusion can be drawn for the expansion
of mandatory counseling regulations; for most of the women who have an abortion, these policies only make
this choice more costly.
6.5.3 Free contraception
The previous policies all impose restrictions on abortions, either directly on women or indirectly by affecting
the availability of providers. As I have showed, they all have important effects in terms of contraceptive
decisions. I now explore a policy that would directly affect the costs of contraception. Particularly, in the
estimation of the model, I assumed that the monthly cost of contraception is $30 (see Section 4). Column 4
of Table 10 shows the changes that a full subsidy on that amount would induce in terms of the choices in
the model.
Contraceptive choices are very responsive to this change in costs. The fraction of women using contracep-
tion increases by 12.3 percentage points (0.8% of women switch from sterilization to standard contraception),
with the effect being slightly larger for women in their late twenties than for women under the age of 24. As
a result, the pregnancy rate decreases by 19.3 pregnancies per 1000 women. The abortion rate for women
ages 18 to 30 falls by 12.4 abortions per 1000 women, a 38% reduction. The drop in abortions is roughly
two thirds of the decrease in pregnancies, implying that a large fraction of the “marginal” women in terms
of the contraceptive use decision are also women with a relatively low cost of obtaining an abortion, rather
than women who are close to indifference between having a child or not. Given this large drop in abortions,
the fraction of pregnancies ending in abortion decreases by 7 percentage points as well. Nevertheless, there
is still a drop in the birth rate of around 8% (6.3 births per 1000 women) on average for young women. This
leads to a decline in the total fertility rate of 0.2 children per woman. Interestingly, the fraction of children
born to single women increases, particularly after age 30 (almost 2 percentage points). This implies that the
rise in contraceptive use is larger for cohabiting and married women than for single women at older ages.
Table 13 shows the effects of the subsidy on contraception costs on the reproductive choices of young
women and on lifetime outcomes, by unobserved type. The top panel presents the changes in abortion rates,
contraceptive use and children born to a woman by age 30. Notice that, even if there are important changes
in abortion and contraceptive choices between ages 18-30 for the two “college types”, there are virtually
no changes in the number of children born to women of these types by age 30. Thus, for these types, the
main effect of the policy is to induce more contraceptive use among women who would have abortion if they
became pregnant. On the other hand, there are large effects on the fertility by age 30 for the “non-college”
types. In particular, the average children born to women of the “non-college, working type” – Type 3 – is
35Grossman et al. (2014) find that the abortion rate for women ages 15-44 in Texas decreased by 13% when comparing the
rates the year before and after the implementation of the firs set of restrictions in HB2.
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0.2 lower. Lifetime fertility for this type decreases by 0.26 children (bottom panel). Thus, most of the effects
on reproductive choices for them occur before age 30.
Interestingly, the timing of the changes in fertility for the “non-college, working” type coincides with
changes in labor supply. By age 30, this type of women have accumulated 3.3% more hours of work.
However, these gains are only 0.5% by age 65. Thus, the positive effects on labor supply for this type are
concentrated on younger ages. In fact, they work slightly less after age 30, showing some substitution from
labor supply at older ages for labor supply at younger ages. For the “stay-home” type, there is a small
increase in labor supply throughout the life-cycle, which is nevertheless important in relative terms (roughly
2%). With respect to schooling, the share of college graduates increases by 1.3 and 1 percentage points for
Types 1 and 2 , the “college types”, respectively.
Finally, let me briefly relate these results to what the literature has found on the effects of similar policies.
A recent study known as the CHOICE project, which provided free contraception to a large sample of women
in the St. Louis area and has been regularly surveying the participants afterwards, collecting information on
their contraceptive use, pregnancies and pregnancy outcomes (i.e. births, miscarriages, abortions). However,
the sample is composed by women who volunteered for the project and thus it is not random. Moreover, given
the research design, there is no appropriate control group for the participants. The CHOICE project focuses
on long term contraception reversible methods such as Intra Uterine Devices and also provides information
on how to properly use contraception methods. Secura et al. (2014) report the pregnancy and abortion rate
for teenagers who participated in the study and compare it to the rates for teenagers in all of the U.S., as well
as to the rates for sexually active teenagers in the U.S. They find that, when compared to these two groups,
the pregnancy rate for the participants in the project is 40% and 78% lower, respectively. The abortion rate
is 34% and 76% lower. Despite the fact that these results refer to a different population (women between 15
and 19 years old), the focus of the project on long-term contraception and the already mentioned issues with
the research strategy, the large differences that they find are consistent with the results that I predict in a
qualitative sense. Kearney and Levine (2009) study the effect of federal waivers that expanded the eligibility
requirements for Medicaid family planning services, which include access to contraceptive methods. They
find that as a result of this policy, the fraction of eligible women who report not using contraception during
last sexual intercourse decreased by 5.3 percentage points. Using the implied take-up rates for these services
reported in their paper, this suggests that the effect on those who actually received the services lies between
13 and 23 percentage points. These results are consistent with the large increase in contraceptive use that I
find in this paper. However, as opposed to Kearney and Levine (2009), I am able to evaluate and quantify
the effects of these policies on abortion decisions.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I structurally estimated a dynamic life-cycle model of abortion, contraceptive use, schooling
and labor supply decisions of young women in the U.S. To account for the underreporting of abortions in
survey data, I specified a biased measurement error process for all fertility outcomes and used aggregate
abortion rates as a source of identification for the parameters in that measurement process. I then used
the estimated model to analyze policies that increase restrictions on abortions in terms of their effects on
reproductive, schooling and labor market choices. I also considered alternative policies that would lower the
cost of contraception and affect abortions through the direct prevention of pregnancies.
The results of the simulation of these counterfactual policies show a large amount of substitution between
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Table 13: Free contraception, effects by unobserved type.
Reproductive choices of young women
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4
Contraceptive use (ppts.) 5.6 14.7 25.1 8.9
7.5% 21.9% 65.0% 113.4%
Abortion rate (per 1000 women) -8.1 -24.9 -24.4 -3.2
-38.7% -41.5% -34.5% -34.0%
Children at age 30 -0.01 -0.02 -0.20 -0.10
-1.4% -3.6% -15.8% -4.0%
Lifetime outcomes
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4
Children -0.19 -0.13 -0.26 -0.13
-19.9% -18.2% -16.4% -3.9%
% College grad. or more 1.3 1.0 0.1 0.0
1.7% 1.3% 26.1% -
Schooling (years) 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.00
0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Experience at age 30 -21 -21 573 107
-0.1% -0.1% 3.3% 2.6%
Experience at age 65 147 83 348 356
0.2% 0.1% 0.5% 1.7%
Earnings $ 7,903 $ 1,923 $ 3,206 $ 4,230
0.6% 0.1% 0.4% 1.8%
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contraception and abortion. For instance, if abortion were banned and that ban were perfectly enforced,
contraceptive use would increase by nearly 11 percentage points. As a result, only one out of every two
abortions would be replaced by an additional birth. Less extreme restrictions on abortions exhibit similar
effects in terms of this substitution pattern. Previous research has found that some abortion restrictions
have effects on abortion rates without affecting birth rates, which suggests a large amount of adjustment
in contraceptive effort as abortion costs rise (Levine et al., 1996). The results in this paper confirm and
quantify these patterns. Moreover, I also find that providing free contraception would have strong effects on
both contraceptive use and abortion decisions. This implies that women who are marginal in terms of the
contraceptive decisions are also those with a relatively low cost of obtaining an abortion.
As a result of expanding mandatory counseling restrictions or closing all the providers in a county,
abortion rates for women ages 18 to 30 would fall by 8% and 7%, respectively. This means that in most
cases – for more than 90% of the women who choose an abortion– these restrictions would simply increase
the cost women face when obtaining an abortion. If all the providers in a given county were to close, 93%
of women living in that county who would have had an abortion would travel to a different county to access
abortion services. Among the small group of women for whom these restrictions would affect their abortion
choices, a majority of these changes would result from the prevention of pregnancies through increased use
of contraception, rather than a change in the abortion decision upon a pregnancy.
Notably, abortion restrictions have important effects on schooling and lifetime earnings, although only
moderate effects on labor supply. If a ban on abortion were implemented and perfectly enforced, accumulated
schooling after high school would decrease by 13% and lifetime earnings by 4.5% for women who would have
otherwise had at least one abortion during their lifetime. Even though a perfectly enforced ban is an extreme
version of restrictions on abortion access, these results show the strong impact that these restrictions have
on women’s human capital accumulation.
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A Appendix I: Functional forms and distributional assumptions
A.1 Functional forms
Preferences The flow utility function in equation (1) can be written as:
Ua = Ca + U
hp
a + U
hf
a + U
s
a + U
N
a + U
f
a −
2∑
k=0
eka − ξaba
Where:
Uhpa = h
p
a(
4∑
l=1
αhpl 1 {type = l}+ αhp5 N∗ + αhp6 (1− hpa−1 − hfa−1) + αhp7 hfa−1) + ηhpa
Uhfa = h
f
a(
4∑
l=1
αhfl 1 {type = l}+ αhf5 N∗ + αhf6 (1− hpa−1 − hfa−1) + αhf7 hpa−1) + ηhfa
Usa = sa(
4∑
l=1
αsl 1 {type = l}+ αs5N∗ + αs6hpa + αs7hfa + αs8a+ αs91 {Sa = 15}+ αs10sa−1) + ηsa
UNa = α
N
1 Na + α
N
2 (N
5
a )
2 + αN3 (N
17
a )
2 + αN4 naN
5
a + α
N
5 naN
17 + αN6 N
5
aN
17
a + α
N
7 maNa + α
N
8 chaNa
Ufa = fa(1− aba)(αf1a+ αf2a2 + αf3na + αf4sa + αf5hpa + αf6hfa + αf7na(1−ma − cha) + αf8cha + ηfa )
And the birth control disutilities are:
e0a = 0 + ν
0
a
e1a = δ
1
0 + ν
1
a
e2a = δ
2
0 + δ
2
1Na + δ
2
2 {a < 25}+ δ23a+ δ24a2 + δ25cha + δ26ma + ν3a
C is consumption; N indicates the total number of children under 18, while n, N5 and N17 are the
number of children in each age group; s is an indicator for school (college/graduate school) attendance; hp
and hf are the labor supply indicators; m and ch are the marital status indicators; f denotes a pregnancy
and ab an abortion; ; and −ξ is the idiosyncratic disutility of getting an abortion. Recall that I have not
included a time constraint. The parameters in the utility function that multiply the interaction of any of the
choices and N∗ are supposed to capture the disutility produced by spending time in that given choice instead
of with the children. The function N∗ measures the children, for this purpose, in terms of the importance
of time relative to a newborn:
N∗ = na + γ1N5a + γ2N
17
a
Thus, αhp5 is the disutility of the time not spent with a newborn due to part-time work, while γ1 measures
the time required for a child between 1 and 5 years of age, relative to the one for a newborn.
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Production function of pregnancies The probability that a pregnancy occurs is a function of the birth
control choice, the level of sexual activity, and some of the state variables.
P (f = 1|bca, SXa, Sa, a) =
Π(bca, SXa, Sa, a) for bca = 1, 20 for bca = 3 (18)
With Π(·) taking a logistic form :
Π(·) = exp(Y
f
a )
1 + exp(Y fa )
And:
Y fa = φ0 + φ1a+ φ2a
2 + 1 {bca = 2} (φ3 + φ4a+ φ5Sa) +
3∑
x=2
φ4+x1 {SXa = x}
Wage Women’s wages, as presented in section 3.4, are given by the product of the unit rental price of
human capital ro for full-time or part-time jobs (o = f, p, respectively) and the woman’s accumulated human
capital Λa:
woa = r
oΛa(Sa, Ha, type, εa)
The accumulated human capital at age a, Λa, is given by:
Λa = exp(
4∑
l=1
βwl 1 {type = l}+ βw5 Sa + βw6 S2a + βw7 ha + βw8 H2a + βw9 a+ εa) (19)
The rental prices rf and rp cannot be identified separately from the all the type specific intercepts. I
thus normalize: rf = 1.
Husband/partner earnings Earnings for the husband or partner are given by:
ln yha = β
h
0 + β
h
1 a+ β
h
2 a
2 + ϕha + ε
h
a (20)
At the beginning of a marriage/cohabitation spell, the “earnings potential” that characterizes the hus-
band/partner, ϕha , is drawn from the normal distribution N(µ
ϕ
a (S, type), σ
2
ϕ), where the mean of the distri-
bution is given by:
µϕa =
4∑
l=1
βϕl 1 {type = l}+ βϕ5 Sa + βϕ6 S2a
As with the wage function, all of the the type-specific means cannot be separately identified from βh0 and
thus I normalize βh0 = 0.
Transition probabilities There are six other exogenous stochastic events in the model: initiating sexual
life, the transition of marital status, the level of sexual activity, a pregnancy not ending in miscarriage, and
the transition between types of locations.
For the sexual initiation hazard, I assume a simple logistic form:
P (sia = 1|sia−1 = 0) = exp(Y
si
a )
1 + exp(Y sia )
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With:
Y sia =
L∑
l=2
ψsil 1 {type = l}ψsi5 a+ ψsi6 a2
The distribution of probabilities over marital status is assumed to follow a logistic form, with a minor
variation. For women who are either single or cohabiting in the current period, the probability distribution
over the next period’s marital status follows a multinomial logit:
P (ma+1 = 1|ma = 0) = exp(Y
m
a )
1 + exp(Y ma ) + exp(Y
ch
a )
P (cha+1 = 1|ma = 0) = exp(Y
ch
a )
1 + exp(Y ma ) + exp(Y
ch
a )
P (ma+1 = 0, cha+1 = 0|ma = 0) = 1
1 + exp(Y ma ) + exp(Y
ch
a )
For currently married woman, it follows a simple logit, as I assume that there are no transitions from marriage
directly into cohabitation:
P (ma+1 = 1|ma = 1) = exp(Y
m
a )
1 + exp(Y ma )
P (cha+1 = 1|ma = 1) = 0
P (ma+1 = 0, cha+1 = 0|ma = 1) = 1
1 + exp(Y ma )
With:
Y ma =
L∑
l=1
1 {type = l} (ψml + ψm4+la+ ψm9 a2 + ψm10sa + ψm11Sa+
cha(ψ
m
12 + ψ
m
13dur(ch)a + ψ
m
14Sa) +ma(ψ
m
15 + ψ
m
16dur(m)a + ψ
m
17Sa)
Y cha =
L∑
l=1
1 {type = l} (ψchl + ψch4+la+ ψch9 a2 + ψch10sa + ψch11Sa+
cha(ψ
ch
12 + ψ
ch
13dur(ch)a + ψ
ch
14Sa)
The level of sexual activity SXa falls in one of three possible categories, indexed by x. I model the
probability of SXa = x, for the different values of x, as an ordered logit:
Pr(SXa = 1) =
1
1 + exp(−Y SXa )
Pr(SXa = 2) =
1
1 + exp(ψSX1 − Y SXa )
− 1
1 + exp(−Y SXa )
Pr(SXa = 3) =1− 1
1 + exp(ψSX1 − Y SXa )
Ya is given by:
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Y SXa = ψ
SX
0 + ψ2a+ ψ
SX
3 a
2 + ψSX4 dmi,a +
4∑
l=2
1 {typea = l} (ψSX(3+l) + ψSX(6+l)dma)
I make the assumption that the transition between the availability of a provider or not is independent
from the transition of a state from not having mandatory counseling to imposing this kind of regulation.
The transition for provider availability follows a first order Markov process with transition matrix:
qloc =
[
1− qloc0,1 qloc0,1
1− qloc1,1 qloc1,1
]
For women who live in a state where mandatory counseling has ever been imposed, the transition matrix is
given by:
qreg =
[
1− qreg0,1 qreg0,1
0 1
]
Whereas for women who don’t live in this type of state, I assume that they assign zero probability to the
state ever imposing it.
Finally, the probability of a miscarriage occurring is simply given by qmc.
Distribution of unobserved types and initial conditions The set of initial conditions includes reli-
giosity (rel), initial age (a), and a list of state variables at age at a: having a newborn (na), whether the
woman has initiated her sexual life or not (sia), the type of location (regtypea), and the lagged labor supply
(ha−1). The type of location can take one of four possible categories, representing the combinations of having
a provider or not in county and whether the state ever is of the restrictive type (in the data, this means that
the state is ever observed to impose mandatory counseling restrictions).
The distribution over unobserved types is assumed to depend on a,na, sia , and regtypea :
P (type = l | a, na, sia, regtypea) = exp(Y
l)
4∑
s=1
exp(Y s)
Where Y 1 = 0 and for l > 1:
Y l = ωl0 + ω
l
1sia + ω
l
2na +
4∑
r=2
ωl1+r1
{
regtypea
}
+ ωl6(a− 18)
A.2 Distributional assumptions
Psychic cost of abortion The abortion disutilities or psychic costs are distributed, conditional on type,
as a log-normal random variable with mean µrel,lξ and variance σξ, where l refers to the unobserved type and
rel to the religiosity category.
µrel,lξ =
4∑
l=1
ζl1 {type = l}+ ζ51 {rel = 2}+ ζ61 {rel = 3} − σξ
2
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The subtraction of
σξ
2
is a normalization that makes
E(ξ|type = l, rel = s) = exp(ζl + ζs+31 {s 6= 1})
Preference shocks I assume that the preference shocks for contraceptive methods are distributed accord-
ing to:
νki,a ∼ Gumbel(0, σν)
Thus, the differences in these shocks are distributed Extreme Value Type I (with scale parameter σν).
The preference shocks for all other choices are distributed multivariate normal with mean zero and sym-
metric variance-covariance matrix:
Ση =

σ2hp σhp,hf σhp,n σhp,s
σ2hf σhf,n σhf,s
σ2n σn,s
σ2s

Because the utility is linear in consumption, there is no need to normalize one of the elements in Ση to fix
the scale.
Wage shocks The wage shock and the shock to the husband’s earnings are each distributed i.i.d. normal,
with mean zero and variances σ2w and σ
2
yh, respectively.
B Appendix II: Measurement error processes
This section complements section 5.1 in the main text.
B.1 Unbiased measurement error for discrete variables
Suppose that we have a variable v that can take one of J possible values. Let v˜ be the observed realization
of the variable and v the true one under the model (simulated one in the context of this paper). What we
want is to specify the measurement error probabilities pij,k = P (v˜ = k|v = j) so that the measurement error
process is unbiased:
P (v˜ = j) = P (v = j)
Keane and Wolpin (2001) (KW) and Keane and Sauer (2010) (KS) use a specification for discrete variables
that can take only 2 different values (in their case, the indicator variables for different choices). In that case,
the measurement error rates are defined as:
pi1,1 = E + (1− E)P1 (21)
pi1,0 = 1− pi1,1 = (1− E)(1− P1)
pi0,1 = (1− pi1,1) P1
(1− P1) = (1− E)P1 (22)
pi0,0 = 1− pi0,1 = E + (1− E) ∗ (1− P1)
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Where P1 = P (v = 1) and E is a parameter to be estimated. This specification satisfies the unbiasedness
restriction. It also satisfies the two conditions on the limit of these conditional probabilities as the P1 goes
to zero or 1 mentioned in KS:
limPj→1pij,j = 1
limPj→0pij,j = E
This can be easily generalized to a multinomial setting. A multinomial specification includes more
information than the binomial one used by KS and KW. The key difference comes from how these two
specifications include “incorrect reports”. As an example, take the case of labor supply that is reported
as part-time when full-time is true. In KS and KW, the contribution this event is treated as reporting no
full-time when full-time is true. The multinomial specification includes information on how it is actually
reported (reporting part-time when full-time is true) and that part-time might be a more or less frequent
choice than not working.
Thus, for a variable v that can take one of J possible values, the pij,k’s can be written as:
pij,k = (1− Ev)Pk
for j 6= k, and
pij, j = Ev + (1− Ev)Pj
Ev is the measurement error parameter for variable v.
This specification satisfies the necessary conditions defined in KS, which in this case are:
1.
J∑
j=1
Pjpij,k = Pk
2. limPj→1pij,j = 1
3. limPj→0pij,j = E
v
4. limPj→1pij,k = 0 (This was automatically satisfied in the binomial case)
The first condition refers to unbiasedness (UB).
B.2 Biased measurement error process for fertility outcomes
The biased measurement error process for fertility outcomes was described in section 5.1. I summarize the
key elements here to highlight the connection with the unbiased process just described and for the purpose
of completeness.
As opposed to the unbiased case, the pij,k’s don’t need to satisfy any restriction (in principle) in a biased
specification. Although KS present a parametric specification that follows a logistic form as an example for
the biased case, that assumption is not necessary. In the particular case of fertility outcomes of this paper,
I have further assumed that the bias comes exclusively from the underreporting of abortions. Thus, for all
the pij,k’s where j 6= ab , the specification is identical to the one of an unbiased case. This is what I referred
to as nested unbiasedness in the main text.
Now, recall that ρ denotes the ratio of reported to true abortion rates. piab,ab, the probability of truthfully
reporting an abortion, can be written as (this is equation (15) in the main text):
piab,ab = ρ− pinp,abPnp + pimc,abPmc + pib,abPb
Pab
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I use values for ρ calculated using aggregate abortion rates, and thus piab,ab becomes a function of other
probabilities in this measurement error process and ρ. Using the specification for these other probabilities
(pij,ab’s) that comes from the nesting the biased process in an unbiased one, piab,ab can be simplified to:
36
piab,ab = ρ− (1− Efer)(1− Pab)
Finally, as mentioned in section 5.1, I further assume that:
piab,b = (1− Efer)Pb
piab,mc = λ(1− piab,ab − piab,b)
piab,np = (1− λ)(1− piab,ab − piab,b)
With λ = 1− qmc.
B.3 Smoothing of ρ and age
As described in section 5.1, I assume that the biased measurement error process for fertility outcomes changes
with age. This is necessary, as the measures of ρ that I construct for different age groups are different: 47% for
women between 20 and 24 years if age, and 33% for women 25-29. Specifying the measurement error process
to change according to these 5-year age groups would have the undesirable consequence of introducing a
discontinuity in the measurement error process: the model will produce abortion rates that change smoothly
with age but the measurement error process would “require” a strong and discontinuous jump between ages
24 and 25. To solve this, I assume that ρa follows the following parametric form:
ρa =
exp(φ0 + φ1a+ φ2a
2)
1 + exp(φ0 + φ1a+ φ2a2)
To estimate the parameters in this process I need at least two more measures for ρ (for age groups) plus
some assumptions. Luckily, as mentioned earlier, my estimates for ρ match those of Jones and Kost (2007),
who also have estimates for women 15 − 19 and 30 − 34. I use these, plus the assumption that the ρ for
a 5-year age group is the same as the ρa for one age in the age group, to estimate the parameters in the
equation for ρa above and produce a smoothed version of these ratios.
B.4 Continuous variables
Finally, for all continuous outcomes (wages, income), I will assume that these variables are measured with
error in the data and that this measurement error u is normally distributed:
c˜v = cv + ucv
ucv ∼ N(0, σ2e−cv)
For each continuous variable cv.
For women who have not initiated their sexual life at age a, the measurement error for the age at sexual
initiation (age(si)) is assumed to follow a latent process where:
36To ensure that piab,ab > 0, the lower limit on E
fer is set accordingly. In an unbiased case E only needs to be larger than 0.
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˜age∗(si) ∼ N(age(si), σ2si)
Because the observed age ˜age(si) can only be an integer, ˜age(si) = x if ˜age∗(si) ∈ [x− 0.5, x+ 0.5).
C Appendix III: Estimation and Parameter estimates
C.1 Likelihood function
Some notation is needed before explicitly writing the likelihood function. First, let us divide the outcome
variables that are used for estimation in three categories: discrete variables that are observed once (X ),
discrete variables that may be observed in each period (Y), and continuous variables that may be observed
in each period (Z):
X ={a, na, sia, rel, regtypea, age(si)}
Y = {h, s, bc, fer, loc, regul, SX,M, }
Z ={w, yh}
Where fer is a variable that summarizes the fertility outcomes for which the measurement error is
assumed to be biased (abortions, miscarriages, pregnancies, births). All other variables have been defined
earlier.
Now, let q be a function that returns the conditional probability mass function for a pair of true and
observed outcomes. For discrete variable V that can take values in {v1, v2, ..., vK}, q is then defined as:
qV (vj |vs) ≡
K∏
k=1
K∏
r=1
P (V˜ = vr|V = vk)1{Vr=vj}1{vk=vs}
With 1 {S} being an indicator function taking the value of 1 is statement S is true. Notice that if variable
V is not observed, q = 1. Finally, let fV be the probability density function of the continuous measurement
error of variable V if variable V is observed:
fV (a) ≡ pdfV (a)1{V 6=∅}
The simulated maximum algorithm that I use is based on the simulation of D histories of outcomes
variables under the model, given a parameter vector Θ. The simulated maximum likelihood function is then
(in logs):37
LL(X˜ , Y˜, X˜ |Θ) =
N∑
i=1
log
 1D
D∑
d=1
 ∏
X∈X
qX(x˜i|xd)
a¯i∏
a=a˜i
∏
Y ∈Y
qYa (y˜i,a|yi,a)
∏
Z∈Z
fZ(z˜i,a − zi,a)
 (23)
37With some abuse of notation, LL(X˜ , Y˜, X˜ |Θ) refers to the observed data. Also, when defining functions q and f , it is clear
that the probability mass functions and probability density functions are not really defined for arguments that are not observed,
as I have incorrectly implied to make this exposition shorter.
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Where a¯i is the oldest age in which woman i is observed in the data. The parameter vector Θ enters
the likelihood function through the the “true” outcome variables which are simulated using the model at a
given value of the parameter vector. I have not written this explicitly to save on notation.
C.2 Calculation of standard errors
The standard errors are estimated using the BHHH estimator (outer product of gradients). However, the
likelihood function is not smooth. Thus, when calculating the scores, I perform the following steps:
1. For each element θk in Θ, evaluate the likelihood function at Θˆ + nk, for n ∈ {−5,−4, ..., 4, 5}.
2. Fit a second order polinomial with the evaluated points. This smooths out the change in LL as you
move Θ around the kth element in a neighborhood of θˆk, the estimated value for that element.
3. Evaluate the derivative of the polynomial at θˆk and use this as an approximation to the partial derivative
of the likelihood function with respect to θk at θˆk.
C.3 Parameter estimates
Table 14: Parameter Estimates
Utility
αhp1 α
hp
2 α
hp
3 α
hp
4 α
hp
5 α
hp
6 α
hp
7
-2.8584 -2.4156 -3.2899 -5.5217 -1.7060 -0.9010 -0.8309
(0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
αhf1 α
hf
2 α
hf
3 α
hf
4 α
hf
5 α
hf
6 α
hf
7
-14.8875 -10.2491 -10.3076 -20.8051 -2.2816 -0.7135 -0.4826
(0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0117) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0001)
αs1 + T
coll αs2 + T
coll αs3 + T
coll αs4 + T
coll αs5 α
s
6 α
s
7 α
s
8 α
s
9 α
s
10
-15.2435 -14.6453 -19.9374 -18.0760 -3.3500 -6.2099 -12.9109 -1.4704 4.9750 -0.8737
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0091) (0.6636) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0016) (0.0002) (0.0063) (0.0002)
αN1 α
N
2 α
N
3 α
N
4 α
N
5 α
N
6 α
N
7 α
N
8
0.3605 -0.0890 -0.0870 0.0946 0.0749 -0.0087 1.7812 0.5996
(0.0017) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0001)
αf1 α
f
2 α
f
2 α
f
2 α
f
2 α
f
2 α
f
2 α
f
2
0.0235 -0.0296 0.0050 -0.4550 -1.3235 -0.4831 -1.8123 -0.3138
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0016) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0032) (0.0007)
δ10 δ
2
1 δ
2
2 δ
2
3 δ
2
3 δ
2
4 δ
2
5 δ
2
6 γ1 γ2
0.3008 2.1756 -1.7089 5.1432 -0.2558 0.0198 -0.0007 -0.6162 0.8460 0.2090
(0.0000) (0.0117) (0.0014) (0.0800) (0.0002) (0.0000) * (0.0028) (0.0000) (0.0000)
ζ1 ζ2 ζ3 ζ4 ζ5 ζ6 σξ
2.3837 1.8346 3.4583 2.1475 0.3384 0.3552 1.1972
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0021) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Budget constraint
T grad − T coll τh κ0 κ1 κ2 cbc1 cbc2
-8.3316 -0.1136 0.4700 0.3335 0.3263 0.3600 4.0000
(0.0024) (0.0000) - (0.0004) (0.0004) - -
Wage
rft rpt βw1 β
w
2 β
w
3 β
w
4 β
w
5 β
w
6 β
w
7 β
w
8 β
w
9
1.0000 -0.2219 1.3419 -0.0833 0.0175 -0.1645 0.0652 -0.0001 0.0160 -0.0002 0.0332
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
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Table 14 :Parameter Estimates (continued)
Husband’s income
βh0 β
h
1 β
h
2 β
ϕ
1 β
ϕ
2 β
ϕ
3 β
ϕ
4 β
ϕ
5 β
ϕ
6
0.0000 0.1761 -0.0051 1.9851 0.0596 0.2130 0.0408 0.0467 -0.0014
- (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0010) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Pregnancies
φ0 φ1 φ2 φ3 φ4 φ5 φ6 φ7
-1.2985 0.0203 0.0017 -0.0042 -1.3396 -0.2140 0.1997 0.1883 0.197
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0010) 0.000
Σeta
σ2hp σhp,hf σhp,n σhp,s σ
2
hf σhf,n σhf,s σ
2
n σn,s σ
2
s
1.3550 0.7012 1.0302 -0.3949 -0.5153 0.6274 -0.1582 -0.4513 -0.8474 1.8905
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Transition probabilities
ψch1 ψ
ch
2 ψ
ch
3 ψ
ch
4 ψ
ch
5 ψ
ch
6 ψ
ch
7 ψ
ch
8 ψ
ch
9 ψ
ch
10
-2.5300 -2.1549 -2.7134 -2.0200 0.0793 0.1492 0.0710 0.0803 -0.0065 -0.5920
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002)
ψch11 ψ
ch
12 ψ
ch
13 ψ
ch
14
-0.0425 3.7291 0.1640 0.1115
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0001)
ψm1 ψ
m
2 ψ
m
3 ψ
m
4 ψ
m
5 ψ
m
6 ψ
m
7 ψ
m
8 ψ
m
9 ψ
m
10
-3.3050 -3.1000 -3.2384 -2.7143 0.0036 0.0061 -0.0058 0.0130 0.0009 -0.4008
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002)
ψm11 ψ
m
12 ψ
m
13 ψ
m
14 ψ
m
15 ψ
m
16 ψ
m
17
0.0382 1.8679 0.1470 0.0420 5.9456 0.3805 0.0591
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
ψsi1 ψ
si
2 ψ
si
3 ψ
si
4 ψ
si
5 ψ
si
6
-0.3620 -0.0221 -0.0387 -0.0111 -0.0822 -0.0021
(0.0000) (0.0018) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0515) (0.0177)
ψSX1 ψ
SX
2 ψ
SX
3 ψ
SX
4 ψ
SX
5 ψ
SX
6 ψ
SX
7 ψ
SX
8 ψ
SX
9
-3.1650 2.5237 0.0440 -0.0120 6.0000 -0.3626 -6.4095 1.9522 0.2885
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0025) (0.0002) (0.0036) (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0001)
qloc0,1 q
loc
1,1 q
reg
0,1 q
mc
0.02462 0.97107 0.09634 0.89643
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Other distributional parameters
σw σh σϕ σnu
0.0499 0.0067 0.4078 0.0512
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Type probabilities
ω21 ω
2
2 ω
2
3 ω
2
4 ω
2
5 ω
2
6
0.0483 -0.0289 -0.1572 0.3873 0.8086 0.1010
(0.0465) (0.0443) (0.0764) (0.0366) (0.0363) (0.0500)
ω31 ω
3
2 ω
3
3 ω
3
4 ω
3
5 ω
3
6
0.0152 -0.0005 0.0077 0.8846 1.2746 0.9194
(0.0377) (0.0361) (0.0576) (0.0262) (0.0278) (0.0325)
ω41 ω
4
2 ω
4
3 ω
4
4 ω
4
5 ω
4
6
-0.5223 -0.0004 0.4597 0.1803 0.8958 -0.0054
(0.0421) (0.0371) (0.0590) (0.0333) (0.0316) (0.0405)
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Table 14 :Parameter Estimates (continued)
Measurement error
Efer Eh Es Esia Erega Eloc Ereg Ebc Em ESX
0.8500 0.3502 0.4148 0.2000 0.8961 0.8535 0.9407 0.4994 0.5857 0.5180
(0.0000) (0.0781) (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0011)
Ea Ena Erel σe−w σe−yh σe−si
0.2000 0.4000 0.2848 0.3298 0.3223 2.6736
(0.0000) (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0007) 0.0000 (0.0001)
Stad. errors in parentheses. (*): Std. error could not be accurately computed.
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